A Path to Transformation:  Asking “The Woman Question” in International Law by Elkayam-Levy, Cochav
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 42 Issue 3 
2021 
A Path to Transformation: Asking “The Woman Question” in 
International Law 
Cochav Elkayam-Levy 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Public Law and Legal 
Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cochav Elkayam-Levy, A Path to Transformation: Asking “The Woman Question” in International Law, 42 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 429 (2021). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol42/iss3/2 
https://doi.org/10.36642/mjil.42.3.path 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
429
A PATH TO TRANSFORMATION:
ASKING “THE WOMAN QUESTION” IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Cochav Elkayam-Levy*
“As feminists articulate their methods, they can become more 
aware of the nature of what they do, and thus do it better.”1
“Method concerns the way one thinks, not what one thinks about, 
although they can be related.”2
I.  Introduction
Methods matter, and the discussion over feminist methods in interna-
tional law is an important one. As Kathrine Bartlett famously noted, “think-
ing about method is empowering.”
3
It makes us more aware of the nature of 
what we do and what we aim to improve in the law.  Consequently, we can 
act more effectively when we examine legal structures and do it with a 
stronger sense of commitment towards our feminist work. Methods are also 
the fundamental means by which we produce “valid knowing.”
4
The discus-
sion of feminist methods in international law is one that engages with the 
combination of rules and assumptions that shape and delimit our views 
about the exclusion of women’s experiences from this doctrine. Methods 
* Visiting Professor at Bar Ilan University; S.J.D & L.L.M with distinction honors, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; former Penn Law Human Rights Scholar.
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1. Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990).
2. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Intersectionality as Method: A Note, 38 SIGNS 1019, 
1019–30 (2013).
3. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 831.
4. MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 1019.
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determine the ways within those limits by which we aim to assert truth 
claims, determine our possibilities and conclusions, and establish the 
grounds for legal reform. Our chosen method defines what we consider as 
evidence and what we accept as proof.
5
Yet, it cannot guarantee a particular
outcome or even the right one.
6
Rather, it provides a sense of discipline in 
our analysis.
Despite their significance, feminist methods in international law have 
been deserted.
7
They seem neglected in ways that have weakened the sense 
of discipline that nurtures both our feminist knowing and our confidence in 
feminist analysis. The prospect of clarifying some of the vagueness is the 
primary motivation for this article. Feminist theories can offer critical anal-
yses that classical theories fail to provide and promote gender equality in 
ways that address its complexity. The greater appreciation of methods is not 
a preference but a present necessity in international law. Among many rea-
sons, understanding methods inspires a better grasp and awareness of our 
intellectual basis and of the growing positionality of feminist knowing in 
global contexts (and even a critical assessment of it). Our ever-situated wis-
dom is what allows us to capture the diverse, intersectional experiences of 
women’s lives. It is also essential in a system predicated on an epistemic 
angle of vision defined by the ability to promise respect for global values 
5. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 830.
6. Id. at 846.
7. For references and discussion of feminist methods in international law, see, e.g., 
Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to Interna-
tional Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Charlesworth et al., Feminist Ap-
proaches to International Law]; Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law,
AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 381 (1999) [hereinafter Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International 
Law]; HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000). Hilary Charlesworth commented in this regard, though in an-
other context, that:
[F]eminist commitments, such as the equality of women, have influenced the de-
velopment of international law, but they have been incorporated only in a partial 
manner and implemented without regard to context or with the empathy for their in-
tended beneficiaries. This underlines a distinction between feminist messages and 
feminist methods in international law. The former have been influential in rhetori-
cal terms, while the latter have been ignored.
Hilary Charlesworth, Talking to Ourselves? Feminist Scholarship in International Law, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: BETWEEN RESISTANCE 
AND COMPLIANCE 17, 32 (Sari Kouvo & Zoe Pearson eds., 2011) [hereinafter Charlesworth, 
Talking to Ourselves].
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and varied narratives.
8
If our knowing in law is forever partial,
9
then our 
methods (i.e. our doing law) are affected as well.
10
This article is, therefore, dedicated to identifying, explaining and differ-
entiating feminist methods in international law. It introduces the potential 
contribution of the method of asking the woman question –  or what can be 
also termed as the gender question for broader inquiries about people of all 
genders – for the work of many international lawyers on their path to devel-
oping feminist consciousness and a pragmatic analytical approach to their 
studies.
11 The woman question seeks to “identify the gender implications of 
rules and practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objec-
tive.”
12
This method strives for a greater understanding of the consequences 
that specific norms or practices have on women or persons who identify 
themselves as women. While this question seeks to highlight and address 
the continuing injustice that women experience, it also allows scholars to 
see beyond the gender binary in ways that take into consideration a spec-
trum of genders and the impact of the law on people of all genders. It pro-
poses clarity and promises a feminist sensitivity to any analysis of interna-
tional law. Above all, it solves a rather perplexing dilemma of a choice 
between the ramified feminist approaches.
Based on the conceptual framework provided by the woman question,
this article develops an analytical model that corresponds with the specific 
limitations of the international legal regime with respect to women. It offers 
three stages for exposing the impact of international law on women, sug-
gesting: (1) initial examination of the global regulation – asking scholars to 
identify the dominant standards that govern the resolution of a certain di-
lemma or problem, and to map the relevant global stakeholders that have the 
mandate or power to address it; (2) an impact assessment – calling on schol-
8. The positional understanding of feminist theory encapsulates the inherent com-
plexity to promote gender equality through international institutions and global legal rules 
which will always be inadequate in the responding to women’s diverse realities.
9. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7.
10. Catharine MacKinnon explains, for example, that having an intersectional method 
means adopting “a distinctive stance” that “embodies a particular dynamic approach to the 
underlying laws of motion of the reality it traces and traps.” MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 
1020 (emphasis added).
11. The woman question is used across disciplines. See, e.g., The Woman Question: 
Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of Philosophy, in WOMAN AND PHILOSOPHY:
TOWARD A THEORY OF LIBERATION 5 (C. Gould & M. Wartofsky eds., 1976) (examining the 
woman question in philosophy); see also Daphne Barak-Erez, Her-meneutics: Feminism and 
Interpretation, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM 85, 95 (Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-
Erez & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2012) (applying this method in constitutional law contexts). Barak-
Erez’s work served as the inspiration for this article, as she discusses the need to see beyond 
existing conflicts between feminist views. Although the different feminist approaches that 
exist in international law contexts are not similarly problematic, the need for an overarching 
method in international law has proved crucial to respond to the thorny dilemma of choosing 
between the differing feminist paradigms.
12. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 837–49.
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ars to look for gaps, opportunities and silences (i.e. unregulated or minimal-
ly regulated areas) that may affect women, including women of different 
cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. Assessing such impact involves, 
for example, studying the dynamics of existing international rules and the 
reality of women’s lives. This entails examining whether women are repre-
sented, and to what extent global norms, concepts, institutions and standards 
respond to women’s interests. An important part of assessing impact is also 
the identification of the hidden social assumptions underlying the rules and 
the narratives that implicitly differentiate between the sexes or exclude 
women; (3) The third and final step encourages scholars to move forward 
upon revealing deficiencies and identify not only corrective measures but 
possible transformative solutions. The article distinctively highlights a nec-
essary paradigmatic shift to examine new opportunities for gender justice by 
reimagining the international legal order – its rules and institutions. It argues 
that asking the woman question in international law should be based on the 
evolving idea of “transformative equality,”
13
which acknowledges the need 
for profound social changes and long-term transformative processes in order 
to address the deeply entrenched societal inequalities based on gender that 
continue to hamper progress towards gender equality and sustainable devel-
opment.
14
13. Sandra Fredman, Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: To-
wards a New Definition of Equal Rights, in 1 TEMPORARY SPECIAL MEASURES:
ACCELERATING DE FACTO EQUALITY OF WOMEN UNDER ARTICLE 4(1) UN CONVENTION ON 
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 111, 115 (Ineke 
Borerefijn, Fons Coomans, Jenny Goldschmidt, Rikki Holtmaat & Ria Wolleswinkle eds., 
2003) (claiming that the conception of equality embodied in the Women’s Convention should 
be regarded as a transformative one); Andrew Byrnes, Article 1 in THE UN CONVENTION ON 
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: A COMMENTARY
51, 55–56 (Marsha A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin & Beate Rudolf eds., 2012) (briefly ex-
plaining the concept of transformative equality).
14. The concept of transformative equality is increasingly gaining traction in interna-
tional human rights law. My research identifies this concept as an emerging new global para-
digm which remains largely under-developed. The process of understanding its significance 
and value has only just begun. At the most basic level, transformative equality is a fascinating 
idea that assumes that the main obstacle for change is that we continue to try and operate 
within a reality of gendered societal structures of hierarchy that perpetuate women’s inequali-
ty, instead of aiming towards transforming them. In other words, we attempt to make women 
fit into certain conceptions and certain forms of institutions that are simply inadequate and 
essentially preserve inequalities. Despite the significance of transformative equality, ambigui-
ty remains regarding the ways to engage transformative processes. It is widely unclear what 
work needs to be done to achieve such transformation. This article suggests several avenues. 
See infra Part IV, n.242. I address these issues more  comprehensively in my ongoing research 
project “A World in Transition: The Global Shift to Transformative Equality” (highlighting 
the growing power of the concept of transformative equality; examining the work of human 
rights bodies including that of CEDAW Committee; showing that presently this work only 
narrowly refers to the concept of transformative equality and provides partial guidance to 
states; further developing this concept and methods to achieve transformation; demonstrating 
its potential for addressing contemporary challenges as well as engaging with possible futures 
related to the advancement of gender equality.) See Cochav Elkayam-Levy, Re-Imagining the 
Summer 2021] A Path to Transformation 433
The goal of this analytical model as proposed in this article is to allow a 
systematic analysis of diverse gender phenomena in international law within 
a clear conceptual framework aiming to encourage international thinkers to 
examine the unique inadequacies of the international legal system. The arti-
cle ultimately shows that the central feminist question in international law is 
the woman question, probing: What is the impact of international law and its 
institutions on women and, in what ways should it be changed or more pro-
foundly transformed? And, more generally, what’s the impact of gender on 
the law?
15
As in many disciplines governing our human knowledge, women simp-
ly were absent in the initial formation of international law and played little 
role in its development. In essence, the language of feminism is a language 
of absence. It is a constant search to fix a void.
16
In scholarly terms, feminist 
inquiry in international law is relatively new and considered to be an emerg-
ing and stirring stream of thought that occupies the work of a growing num-
ber of young international lawyers of all genders.
17
Feminist theories, more 
generally, analyze the masculinity and partiality of our disciplinary 
knowledge.
18
The feminist project is a project of rethinking and reshaping 
human understanding of the world in a manner that reflects and appreciates 
the contribution of women to society, claims justice for their experiences, 
and offers a new angle to the way we think of our community. Feminist the-
ories explore “the exclusion of (some) women’s needs, interests, aspirations, 
Rules – the Global Transition to Transformative Equality and the Narratives of Feminist Reli-
gious Movements (Dec. 31, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757963 (providing additional 
details on this project).
15. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, supra
note 7.
16. Feminist inquiry in international law is relatively new. See Mary Robinson, Fore-
word, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 1 (Doris Buss & Ambreena 
Manji eds., 2005); see also Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminisms: When 
Discourses Keep Meeting, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 47
(Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005) (noting that feminist scholarship in international 
law began in the mid-1980s focusing on the task of adding women to human rights protections 
guaranteed under international law. Global feminist activism appeared earlier); Dianne Otto, 
Feminist Approaches to International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 488 (Anne Orford & Florian Hoffman eds., 2016) (explaining that
feminist engagement with international law grew significantly by the mid-1990s, but also not-
ing that women continue to struggle for basic rights rather than being treated as full rights-
bearing subjects of the law).
17. It was less than two decades ago that Charlesworth and Chinkin published their 
landmark book, The Boundaries of International Law, in which they attempted to systematize 
feminist scholarship and its critique of the international legal system. This book remains the 
single most important text on feminist theories and of feminist readings in international law.
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7. In 1992, Karen Engle analyzed feminist critiques 
of international human rights law and described it as an area in the literature which contained
about a dozen academic works. Engle, supra note 16, at 59.
18. Including the partiality of feminist inquiry itself. See Denise Reaume, What’s Dis-
tinctive about Feminist Analysis of Law, 2 LEGAL THEORY 265 (1996).
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or attributes from the design or application of the law.”
19
In international le-
gal contexts, feminists assume that women’s absence from the creation of 
international law has distorted the discipline’s boundaries and logic.
20
The 
fact that women were not allowed to make intellectual contributions to this 
field meant that it represented a narrow range of interests  and continues to 
have tremendous ongoing effects on the status of women.
21
The exclusion of 
women in international law has created a structural bias that requires fun-
damental changes in order to address women’s inequality. Attempts for the 
simple inclusion of women are thus bound to be very limited.
As Hilary Charlesworth points out, feminist methods thus therefore 
“seek to expose and question the limited bases of international law’s claim 
to objectivity and impartiality and insist on the importance of gender rela-
tions as a category of analysis.”
22
Endorsing a “feminist perspective”
23
in the 
study of the international legal regime means acknowledging that this re-
gime is challenged for its gendered constructions and for being developed 
mostly by men in ways that may perpetuate women’s inequality.
24
Feminist 
readings  more generally  require constant reconceptualization of norms and 
organizing principles of the system in order to better address women’s con-
cerns.
25
19. Hilary Charlesworth, Gender and International Law, in HANDBOOK ON GENDER IN 
WORLD POLITICS 139 (Jill Steans & Daniela Tepe-Belfrage eds., 2016).
20. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 1–18.
21. For example, feminists’ demands that domestic violence become a serious interna-
tional concern involved breaking many barriers, conceptual and institutional. The term “vio-
lence against women” is not mentioned in the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW). It was only in the early 90’s that the U.N. General Assembly 
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which clarified that 
states must not evade their obligations to eliminate violence against women, and that the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women adopted General Recom-
mendation No. 19 on violence against women which provided a more detailed and compre-
hensive review of the issue. See Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women Eleventh Session, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1993) (note that GR No. 35 rec-
cently updated GR No. 19). For a related discussion, see Otto, supra note 16, at 490 (discuss-
ing the trajectories of feminist reform projects in international law).
22. Charlesworth, supra note 19, at 159.
23. I primarily use the term “perspective” to describe the angle of vision for the in-
quiry.
24. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 1 (“Women form over half of the 
world’s population, but their voices, in all their variety, have been thoroughly obscured by and 
within the international legal order, hence they deserve to be heard and their interests to be 
fully integrated and protected.”).
25. Id. at 1; see also Otto supra note 16, at 490 (arguing “the practices of critique and 
reform, and their productive tensions, are essential to resisting the law’s colonization of femi-
nist politics and keeping feminist imaginaries of a better world alive . . . It is in the interstices 
of hope and despair, conundrum and paradox, that feminists have the best chance of under-
standing how international law might yet be a means for promoting feminist change.”).
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The gender-based distinctive focus of feminist theories on the struc-
tures, substance, actors, and normative foundations of the international re-
gime has considerable implications for international law. Though it was 
hard to imagine this development only two decades ago,
26
in recent years, 
feminist theory has been among the most rapidly expanding areas of norma-
tive analysis of international law.
27
Feminist scholarship is proliferating in 
almost every global discussion.
Despite the limitations that feminists identify in their studies of interna-
tional law, they do not cease constructing ways toward a more progressive 
and inclusive international legal realm.
28
Feminists continue to show faith in 
this system and invoke international law “as a source of transformation and 
empowerment” and even “as a safety net for women, who often face dis-
crimination in national legal systems.”
29
They “encourage a rethinking of 
the discipline of international law so that it can offer a more useful frame-
work for international and national justice.”
30
Feminist trust in international 
law should not come as a surprise. The work of international lawyers is 
deeply rooted in the belief that the international system has the power to 
ameliorate domestic circumstances.
31
The confidence in international law is 
evident, especially in the area of human rights law where multiple legal 
mechanisms operate to ensure states’ compliance with human rights norms. 
International law is considered by feminists to have transformative potential 
for the development of human society and for the protection of human and 
women’s rights. Catharine MacKinnon expresses this notion when she 
comments on the relation between international and national legal systems, 
“the further away from home women go, the experience has been, the more 
26. See Charlesworth, supra note 19, at 137 (noting “[i]nternational law has been slow 
to pay attention to the concept of gender.”).
27. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 1; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Creating In-
ternational Law: Gender as New Paradigm, in NON-STATE ACTORS, SOFT LAW AND
PROTECTIVE REGIMES: FROM THE MARGINS 17 (Cecilia M. Baillet ed., 2012) (stating “Gen-
der as reality, analysis, and rubric has created some of the fastest and most far-reaching trans-
formations in international law in our time.”).
28. Otto, supra note 16, at 490 (noting feminist engagements struggle with “how to 
engage critically with the law’s gendered languages and practices, while simultaneously seek-
ing to use it to advance women’s rights and world peace in the present.”)
29. Charlesworth, supra note 19, at 141.
30. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 1
31. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 3 (2009); see also Daphne Barak-Erez, The International Law of 
Human Rights and Constitutional Law: A Case Study of an Expanding Dialogue, 2 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 611, 632 (2004) (arguing that there is a “growing influence of international law on 
national judiciaries” and that “national courts are tending to increase their recourse to interna-
tional instruments, particularly in the context of applying international human rights norms”); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domes-
tic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L. J. 328 (2006).
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rights they get.”
32
In this sense, although feminist thought is subversive and 
fundamentally critical, it also strives for the protection and constant im-
provement of the international system. As the global order grows more and 
more chaotic and increasingly motivated by power struggles,
33
moving to-
wards stagnation in many areas, feminist work appears to have a crucial sta-
bilizing power. The tremendous global economic-growth potential of clos-
ing gender gaps alone validates this assumption.
34
It seems that now more 
than ever before, international law will increasingly come to depend on the 
answers to questions that feminist theorists pose.
The growing engagement with gender issues and feminist ideology 
proves its increasing relevance to all international lawyers. Yet, it also pre-
sents a new, interesting challenge: The fundamental difficulty currently fac-
ing feminist readings of international law seems to lie in the accessibility of 
feminist thought as a shared legal method.
35
In other words, feminist thought 
as a consolidated legal method is not accessible to all scholars to adopt con-
ceptually and implement practically. Despite the apparent straightforward-
ness of the field, it includes divergent streams of thought that portray multi-
ple, sometimes conflicting, ideas.
36
This results in a certain lack of 
accessibility to the field.
For many international lawyers, the first encounter with the full breadth 
of feminist thought in international law is methodologically confusing. 
There are many strands of feminism. Methods are not clearly delineated, 
causing feminist thought to appear to be lacking practical analytic tools. To-
day, more than ever before, it may be challenging to frame gender issues, 
analyze them systematically, and feel confident in their conclusions. The 
fact that often feminist methods are more commonly referred to in interna-
tional legal contexts as “approaches” or “perspectives” rather than methods 
32. MacKinnon supra note 27, at 30 (noting “[d]istance appears to attenuate the male 
bond, making it more likely that women’s violations will be will be recognized as real.”).
33. William Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment 
and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2015) (examining the implications of the 
current redistribution of power for international law. The author claims that while internation-
al lawyers have long debated the ability of law to constrain state behavior, the debate has 
shifted from the power of law to the role of power within international law).
34. See, e.g., The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women’s Equality Can Add $12 
Trillion to Global Growth, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/how-advancing-
womens-equality-can-add-12-trillion-to-global-growth (stating “[b]oth advanced and develop-
ing countries stand to gain. In 46 of the 95 countries analyzed, the best in-region outcome 
could increase annual GDP in 2025 by more than 10 percent over the business-as-usual case, 
with the highest relative boost in India and Latin America.”).
35. Charlesworth, Talking to Ourselves?, supra note 7.
36. Charlesworth, supra note 19, at 141–42.
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adds to this complexity.
37
These references imply that feminist methods are 
not fully understood. Beyond the hurdle of identifying the distinct guiding 
analytical precepts of the various views, choosing between them presents 
serious difficulties.
This article aims to show that, despite their wildly different assump-
tions, feminist methods can still be understood as a cohesive unit by asking 
the woman question. For many international lawyers, the contribution of the 
international legal system depends on the law’s ability to include women, to 
express and address the complexities involved in materializing women’s 
equal status in society, and to construct ways of overcoming obstacles at the 
domestic level. The method of asking the woman question corresponds with 
these demands. The woman question both identifies deficiencies in interna-
tional law and provides for their remedies. While encouraging lawyers to 
challenge the international legal system to take better account of women, 
this method also asks how the system may be transformed. It asks how the 
international legal system may be reinvented to remain a relevant, strong, 
stable, and effective legal system in establishing a normative conceptual 
framework to guide states in securing human rights and the rule of law. The 
woman question is a framework of critical thought that conjoins the diverse 
corpus of feminist approaches into a shared inquiry. It inspires the search 
for new possibilities to secure justice and equality for women while recog-
nizing the power of international law to mobilize change in the world.
Part II discusses the gender perspective in international law, exploring 
its background and origins. It explains how gender has developed to become 
a central concept for examination in international law. Part III then distin-
guishes between the main feminist theories and their methods in the study of 
international law. It identifies the ways feminist theories translate into 
methods. This examination underscores the distinct questions that each the-
oretical strand offers. As shall be shown, each of the theories reveals gen-
dered features that more traditional theories of international law tend to ig-
nore or neglect. Although the variety of choices may not always be 
problematic and even instrumental for exposing gender inequalities,
38
it can 
37. Feminist theories or approaches refer to the system of assumption and principles 
posed to explain the impact of gender. Methods or techniques are the specific tools or ques-
tions we use to examine the law.
38. Charlesworth and Chinkin suggest that no single feminist theory is adequate in the 
scrutiny of international law. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 23, 48–52. 
Although the preferred intellectual path is to choose one theory and apply its methodology 
throughout the research, feminist inquiry into international law leads some scholars to adopt a 
sporadic method of research. This approach to feminist analysis has been described by Marga-
ret Radin as “situated judgment,” defined as using various analytic strategies rather than a sin-
gle feminist theory. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatic and The Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1699, 1718–19 (1990). Rosi Braidotti describes the global range of feminism as “multi-
ple literacies” which entail “being able to engage in conversation in a variety of styles, from a 
variety of disciplinary angles, if possible in different languages.” Rosi Braidotti, The Exile,
the Nomad, and the Migrant: Reflections on International Feminism, 15 WOMEN’S STUD.
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have a paralyzing effect when researchers attempt to decide “which feminist 
view to prioritize.”
39
There seems to be a crucial need to articulate a clear, 
overarching method that would allow for a more general and common gen-
der-based scrutiny of international law. Part IV advances the argument that 
the woman question provides a unique conceptual framework to address the 
most problematic, deeply rooted limitations of the international system con-
cerning women. Asking the woman question in international law has con-
siderable value in that it enables us to rise above the differences in the vari-
ous feminist methods and more broadly examine the impact of the law on
women while maintaining that other methods could be significant, as well, 
under certain circumstances.
40
Part IV also offers a three-stage model for 
exposing the impact of international rules on women. As noted in the begin-
ning of this introduction, the model promoted in this article reflects a future-
oriented reconstruction of the international legal regime. It is based on the 
idea of transformative equality, which urges transformational future think-
ing and acknowledges the need to redefine institutions and systems so that 
they will no longer rest on male paradigms. The model calls to examine new 
opportunities for reform by reimagining the international legal order, along 
with its conceptual bases,
41
in ways similar, for example, to decision-making 
from behind the “veil of ignorance.”
42
Though radically reimagining the sys-
tem is a substantial challenge, it has great potential to transform gendered 
legal constructions into just and egalitarian mechanisms. Put another way, 
the reconstruction work proposed here means not only thinking about what 
could be done differently today, but what would have been done had wom-
INT’L F. 7, 10 (1992). However, the major weakness of such an approach is its eclectic nature 
which may result in theoretical incoherence and insecurity regarding how to go about apply-
ing a range of techniques or what would be considered as valid outcomes.
39. Barak-Erez, supra note 11, at 92.
40. Barak-Erez suggested using the woman question within constitutional law as “an 
interpretive principle: giving preferences to interpretive choices that are less inclined to dis-
proportionally disadvantage women.” She argued that it is possible to apply this method “to 
avoid interpretive choices that disproportionately burden women and to prefer, where possi-
ble, interpretive alternatives that promote the just allocation of social burdens (and thus even-
tually improve also the situation of men, who are burdened by other social stereotypes and 
expectations).” In her view, a feminist interpretative choice should generally strive to promote 
protection of women and to have a “positive impact on women’s life conditions.” Barak-Erez 
further offers searching for solutions that express “a material interest of women as a group.”
Id. at 95–97.
41. In this sense, this analysis expresses many of the insights and logic of radical legal 
feminism.
42. The “veil of ignorance” is a method in moral philosophy of determining 
the morality of judgments and decisions. It offers a process of decision making in which one 
has no knowledge regarding his or her social status (including regarding their own sex, race, 
social class, origin, and even conceptions of the good) so that they judge a situation in the 
most objective and moral manner possible. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11
(Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1971).
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en’s experiences been considered at the inception of the international legal 
system.
43
II. Gender and International Law
A. From Irrelevance to Expansion
The feminist critique of international law is the result of relatively re-
cent but significant literature.
44
The 1990s represented the beginning of what 
would become a new, distinct legal field of feminist research in internation-
al law.
45
Before that, for many years, it was unclear whether feminism and 
feminist theories had any relevance to international law.
46
International legal 
concepts such as sovereignty, use of force, defined territory, and state re-
sponsibility appeared “gender free” and immune to feminist inquiries.
47
In-
ternational law is primarily concerned with the actions taken by nation-
states, which do not have a sex or gender. The fact that the actions taken by 
43. For example, some claim that to solve domestic violence, we must engage with na-
tional security bodies, both internationally and nationally. Feminist activists are also creating 
new partnerships with the private sector and local tech companies to address challenges in 
protecting victims of domestic violence. These examples show that global attempts to elimi-
nate violence against women require rethinking of the very global institutions and global pro-
cedures that supervise states’ actions. It involves asking whether new incentives are needed
and whether other international bodies – such as the security council or partners from the pri-
vate sector and tech industry – should take greater part in the global efforts to address domes-
tic violence and to tackle gender inequality. See, e.g., Pnina Sharvit Baruch, National Security 
Tools and the Fight Against Domestic Violence (INSS Insight No. 1399, Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/domestic-violence/?offset=2&posts=48&outher=Pnina
%20Sharvit%20Baruch; Sophie Samuels, New Browser Based “Risk Questionnaire”, to Sup-
port Victims of Domestic Violence, SOC. IMPACT ISR., https://socialimpactil.com/i-
risk/?fbclid=IwAR3nNXTBAp878PiwujKhAPWwqr0_DyxEjTDlTiAWwEpnN0qQZTO2n
1B4ZnE (last visited Apr. 23, 2021).
44. For an extensive examination of the feminist engagement in international law, see
Otto, supra note 16; see also Sari Kouvo & Zoe Pearson, Introduction, in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND 
COMPLIANCE, supra note 7, at 1.
45. Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN 
FEMINIST APPROACHES, supra note 16, at 1 (explaining that since the early 1990s feminist
scholarship on international law became “an accepted part of the legal academy”); see also
Engle, supra note 16, at 47 (describing her work in the early 1990s in which she analyzed 
what appeared to be a new literature of feminist critique studies of international human rights 
law); Otto, supra note 16, at 489 (noting that by the early 1990s, more critical voices 
emerged, pointing to the marginalization of women and of their concerns by global institutes).
46. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 614 
(questioning the “immunity” of international law to feminist analysis and explaining that in-
ternational legal concepts such as sovereignty, use of force and state responsibility at first 
sight seem to have no impact on women); see also Charlesworth, supra note 19, at 137 (de-
scribing the slow response to new feminist theories).
47. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 
614.
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nation-states affect both sexes or genders was largely unseen.
48
In fact, to 
date, international legal theories focus mostly on studying and explaining 
the basis of states’ obligations to a system that lacks a centralized authority 
to enforce the states’ adherence to global commitments.
49
With a great deal 
of generalization, these theories often address the binding nature of interna-
tional law and the relationship between sovereign states and international 
community.
50
They attend, for example, to questions about the nature and 
formation of international commitments and states’ compliance with inter-
national legal obligations.
51
In light of this understanding of international 
law, scholars believed that feminist theories had little to contribute to this 
field,
52
and questions about the situation of women simply seemed peripher-
al or unsuitable. Similarly, as feminist theories pursued a very different, 
even political, goal, their contribution to international law was difficult to 
perceive or accept as legitimate in the study of international law.
53
Despite the apparent irrelevance of (and resistance to) questions about 
gender in international law, during the early 1990s, feminist voices began to 
emerge in international legal literature.
54
International law scholars were in-
spired by a broad range of feminist academics but mostly by feminist inter-
48. The only area that received increased attention was human rights law where the 
impact on individuals is more apparent. Id.; see also, Engle, supra note 16, at 52 (noting the 
influence of feminist activists on the establishment of international legal instruments that per-
tain to women’s rights).
49. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 23 (exploring traditional internation-
al law theories and their “limited explanatory force with respect to the position of women”).
50. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55–63 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 6th 
ed., 1997).
51. Id. at 55–63 (mentioning that the recurring themes of international law theories are 
the relationship between sovereign states and international society, and the search for convinc-
ing explanation for the binding quality of international law in a state-dominated world).
52. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that legal scholarship the-
orizing international law has not addressed the situation of women worldwide, not even min-
imally).
53. An important exception is the International Women’s Movement which had a sig-
nificant impact on The Hague Conventions and on certain crucial developments in interna-
tional law after World War I. Women’s peace organizations sought to support the establish-
ment of international institutions as means to advance peaceful resolutions to international 
disputes. See Freya Baetens, The Forgotten Peace Conference: The 1915 International Con-
gress of Women, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger 
Wolfrum ed., 2010); see also JANE ADAMS, EMILY BALCH, & ALICE HAMILTON, WOMEN AT 
THE HAGUE: THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF WOMEN AND ITS RESULTS (2003); Hilary 
Charlesworth, Feminist Critiques of International Law and Their Critiques, 13 THIRD WORLD 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1995) (noting that feminist theories are often criticized by the masculine 
academy for lack of “disinterested” scholarship and “objective” analysis); Fernando Teson, 
Feminism and International Law: A Reply, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 647 (1994) (arguing that femi-
nist scholarship lacks objectivity and academic rigor, as well as presents conceptually con-
fused theses).
54. See Charlesworth, supra note 19, at 137.
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national relations (“IR”) experts.
55
IR scholars began asking, “Where are the 
women?”
56
They criticized the fact that women were so rarely heard in 
global political discourses and excluded from the political field.
57
They re-
searched the causes of the marginalization of women in international poli-
tics and their subsequent implications. As the inadequacies of the system 
were unveiled, investigating the contribution of women to the global arena 
became important to IR scholars.
58
Soon afterward, feminist ideas and fem-
inist questions started making sense to international law experts who then 
commenced study on how women were excluded from the international le-
gal terrain and the initial design of this area of law. Scholars began asking 
whether and how international legal concepts and structures influence wom-
en or perpetuate gender inequality.
59
With women “out of the picture” since 
international law’s inception, Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin argued 
that international law was constructed upon particular male assumptions, 
where “man” was taken to represent “human” so that “international law 
[was] both built on and operates to reinforce gendered and sexed assump-
tions.”
60
Feminist studies suddenly became deeply relevant to international law 
disciplines, and feminist involvement in international law constantly grew 
and developed as a distinct legal field.
61
One famous example of the success 
of feminist work in international law is the criminalization of wartime rape 
in international criminal tribunals and its recognition as a crime against hu-
manity and genocide.
62
In an ongoing effort, activists managed to bring at-
55. Such as Cynthia Enloe, V. Spike Peterson, Jan Jindy Pettman and J. Ann Tickner.
56. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES AND BASES: MAKING FEMINIST 
SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 211 (Univ. of Ca. Press 2d ed., 2014).
57. See, e.g., J. Ann Tickner, You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements 
between Feminists and IR Theorists, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 611, 628 (1997) (discussing the 
relationship between feminist and “mainstream” international relations scholars); see also
J. TICKNER, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1992); J. PETTMAN, WORLDING 
WOMEN: A FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1996).
58. See, e.g., ENLOE, supra note 56, at 79; see also LORRAINE CODE, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF FEMINIST THEORIES 272 (Routledge, 2002) (arguing that feminists should not only seek 
to include themselves in the higher realms of policymaking and leadership, but should also 
search for where women have already fulfilled roles to “ensure the international system 
works smoothly and efficiently,” such as “the work done by diplomatic wives and military 
prostitutes,” and by way of example, argues that the unpaid labor of diplomatic wives 
served to develop and sustain an atmosphere of conductive diplomacy and stable political 
and military relations among nations).
59. See, e.g., CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 1.
60. Id. at 16.
61. See e.g., Engle, supra note 16 (discussing the ever-growing feminist research in 
international law).
62. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998) (con-
cluding that rape and sexual assault can constitute acts of genocide when “they were commit-
ted with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a targeted group, as such”); see also Report 
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, art. 
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tention to one of the most hideous systematic crimes committed against 
women during  armed conflict and to ensure its insertion into international 
criminal law. Thanks to their work, gender-based violence during war is 
now an issue that constitutes a significant concern for the international 
community.
63
Another major achievement of women’s rights activists at the global 
level were the efforts that led to the groundbreaking Resolution 1325 of the 
Security Council on Women, Peace, and Security.
64
The resolution reaffirms 
women’s role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotia-
tions, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, and post-
conflict reconstruction. The resolution also recognizes the importance of 
women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the 
maintenance and promotion of peace and security. After years of feminist 
critical legal writing and advocacy work, the Security Council recognized 
women’s vital role in maintaining peace and security and preventing con-
flicts. This work catalyzed a new set of global commitments dedicated to 
assuring state-actions, research, and domestic implementation to ensure 
women’s participation.
65
To conclude, as Charlesworth and Chinkin contended almost two dec-
ades ago, while the international legal system is broad in scope, covering a 
wide range of normative prescriptions, it remains limited in perspective, 
especially towards women: “Women form over half of the world’s popula-
tion, but their voices, in all their variety, have been thoroughly obscured by 
and within the international legal order, hence they deserve to be heard and 
5(g), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 
3453 mtg. 1994, at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1996) (defining rape in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda as a crime against humanity, and considering rape and forced prostitu-
tion as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions). See generally Janet Halley, Rape at 
Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive In-
ternational Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008) (examining the work of organized 
feminism in the formation of new international criminal tribunals over the course of the 
1990s).
63. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 27 (extensively examining the impressive and 
relatively fast development of gender-based crimes in international law).
64. S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) (outlining actions and guidelines to be taken by the 
Secretary General, the Security Council, UN entities and member states with goal of main-
streaming gender and assuring women’s participation in peace and security policies and prac-
tices).
65. Since 2000, a further ten thematic Women, Peace and Security (“WPS”) resolutions 
have been adopted by the UN Security Council. The resolutions focus on protection of women 
and children during armed conflict (especially from sexual violence), recognition of women’s
rights and promotion of gender equality and women’s participation in conflict related decision 
making. These resolutions are: 1325 (2000); 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 
(2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019). For a discus-
sion of the 1325 Resolution, see Christine Chinkin, Adoption of 1325 Resolution, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY 26 (Sara E. Davies & Jacquie True 
eds., 2018).
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their interests to be fully integrated and protected.”
66
In many ways, feminist 
theories attempt to remove the illusion of gender-neutrality that has domi-
nated the field of international law. They show that the international legal 
system must strive to reform its gendered features to fulfill its promise as a 
useful framework for international and national justice. Feminists challenge 
whether international law has been inclusive of women, whether it is re-
sponsive to the global situation of women, and how international legal struc-
tures and norms operate regarding women and their rights. Feminist studies 
in international law embrace a position that “regards gender as important.”
67
B. Feminist Critiques of Human Rights Law
Having considered the meaning of a feminist perspective in internation-
al law, it is necessary to distinctly consider human rights law and the rele-
vance of a feminist stance in this context.
In many ways, women have a voice in this domain. Unlike other areas 
of international law, human rights law has been relatively receptive to wom-
en’s concerns.
68
Human rights instruments have given individuals, including 
women, recognition and direct access to the international legal system and 
the possibility of making international legal claims.
69
These instruments al-
low individuals the unique opportunity to turn to international mechanisms 
and bring claims concerning their rights against states.
70
More generally, the 
international human rights system applies various mechanisms that offer 
special protection for women.
As a result, it is not surprising that there is some uneasiness associated 
with feminist critiques of human rights law. Uneasiness is understandable, 
as challenging human rights may appear “ungrateful,” and could potentially 
undermine feminist gains in this area.
71
For instance, Charlesworth and 
Chinkin described feminist critique of human rights as “remarkably rare,”
and noted that “those concerned with the protection of human rights in gen-
eral may well be reluctant to challenge the form of human rights law at a 
fundamental level, fearing that such a critique may be used to reduce the 
hard-fought-for advances in the area.”
72
Presenting critiques in the area of 
66. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 1.
67. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 
643.
68. See Jane Connors, NGOs and The Human Rights of Women at the United Nations,
in THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UN SYSTEM 147 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996) (discussing the activity of 
women’s groups at the international level from the early twentieth century and its gains in the 
range of instruments dealing with women).
69. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 201.
70. Including, for example, in the form of complaints and communication submitted by 
individuals under the human rights treaties.
71. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 210.
72. Id. at 201.
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human rights law seemed counter-intuitive and raised the risk that it would 
weaken an already weak discourse (in terms of states’ compliance, for ex-
ample).
Nevertheless, feminist scholarship has profound relevance to human 
rights law. Despite the conceptual difficulties and practical concerns, count-
less international scholars have illustrated that women’s rights are still re-
stricted within human rights law.
73
Their work has proven that human rights 
law requires feminist scrutiny and would benefit from a feminist perspec-
tive. Mary Robinson, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and former President of Ireland, articulated this development:
When international law became the subject of sustained feminist 
scholarly scrutiny and activism over a decade ago, it opened up 
new thinking, new language and new priorities. It became clear that 
international human rights law had suffered from the absence of 
women’s voices.
74
From the moment feminist scholars and activists turned their attention 
toward international human rights law in the early 1990s, the scholarship in 
this field has proliferated with some implications on diverse areas. There are 
many critical gender-related findings in human rights law that underscore its 
importance. An initial issue in the feminist critique of human rights law has 
been an investigation into whether international formulations of rights are 
adequate for women.
75
In other words, are the attempts to advance these 
rights actually beneficial for protecting women?
76
Within feminist literature there are several viewpoints towards the 
“rights discourse.” Mackinnon, for instance, explains that “the status and 
treatment of men still tacitly but authoritatively define the human universal, 
73. See Charlesworth, supra note 19, at 170, 218 (noting that “analysis of the under-
standing of human rights in international law generally has shown that the definition of human 
rights is limited and androcentric”); see also GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Karen Knop ed.,
2004); WOMEN’S RIGHTS/HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (J. Pe-
ters & A. Wolper eds, 1995). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994) (assessing human rights law in 
light of women’s experiences and concerns).
74. See Robinson, supra note 16, at v.
75. See Nicola Lacey, Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women, in GENDER 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 13, 16 (critically examining the “rights discourse” in 
feminist legal and social theory).
76. See Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private 
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 104 (1993) (noting 
“the criticism focuses on the inability of rights discourse to bridge the gap between the indi-
vidual and the social”); see also CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 208 (exploring 
“feminist critiques of rights and whether international formulations of rights are useful for 
women” examining critiques that suggest for example that women’s experiences and concerns 
might not translate well into a narrow language of rights).
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eliding the particularity of being a man.”
77
Human rights were predominant-
ly envisioned as men’s rights and were designed to address men’s concerns. 
Mackinnon points to the limits of our understanding of “torture,” as an ex-
ample of this difficulty, and highlights the masculine descriptions that de-
fine inhuman treatment.
78
Other scholars similarly argue that the rights dis-
course itself over-simplifies the complex power relations between men and 
women,
79
and a continuing focus on rights acquisition may not be as valua-
ble as previously thought to the position of women in practice.
80
  Certainly, 
the language of “rights” can often be too narrow and may fail to reflect 
women’s experiences.
81
These critiques highlight the importance of ques-
tioning the efficacy of human rights law for women.
82
The discussion over 
human rights and women requires constant rethinking and adjustment. For, 
in reality, the current system of human rights may not be doing justice with 
women’s specific concerns.
83
This limited nature of human rights law ought 
to be recognized.
Moreover, human rights law has been shown to be particularly vulnera-
ble to non-compliance especially when it comes to the protection of wom-
en’s rights.
84
Historical accounts of the international legal system indicate 
that “human rights law is under constant challenge.”
85
While most states 
formally accept the international regime, actual compliance is often under-
mined by extensive reservations, derogation provisions (that permit the 
prevalence of national law), and inadequate national implementation 
measures.
86
The issue of non-compliance is indeed one of the known weak-
77. CATHARINE MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
DIALOGUES 3 (2006)
78. MacKinnon demonstrates that women’s accounts of torture are not regarded as such 
despite being brutal and inhuman. She then shows that the definition of “torture” should be 
broadly construed to include systematic sexual abuse. Id. at 17–27.
79. See Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEG. F.
59 (1989) (questioning whether critical social theory, which has been an interest for critical 
legal theorists, is helpful to understanding power and structural inequalities).
80. See E. KINGDOM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH RIGHTS? PROBLEMS OF FEMINIST 
POLITICS OF LAW (1992) (discussing the problem of the rights discourse and how it reduces 
the knowledge of feminism and women’s power).
81. See generally Lacey, supra note 75.
82. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 208 (arguing that campaigns for 
women’s human rights can play a useful role in advancing women’s equality, although they 
agree that ‘the limited nature of rights must be acknowledged.’”).
83. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 625 
(exploring the normative structure of international law noting that it “has allowed issues of 
particular concern to women to be either ignored or undermined”).
84. See HENRY STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1124 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d 
ed., 2008) (examining the use of reservations).
85. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, 207.
86. Id. at 207–08.
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nesses of human rights law, yet women remain a group for which non-
compliance is typically aggravated.
87
The reasons for and implications of 
this special vulnerability must also be taken into account  and demonstrate 
the importance of feminist inquiries in human rights law.
Finally, the feminist critiques of human rights law have been tremen-
dously significant, as they have illuminated liberal distinctions of public 
versus private spheres operating in this field.
88
Madhavi Sunder has famous-
ly shown that many liberal states continue to give authority in the private 
sphere to religious institutions that openly aspire to maintain the unequal
position of women.
89
The public-private distinction is often used to associate 
women with the private and the minimally-regulated—and often devalued—
areas of home, hearth, and family, whereas men and masculine ideas domi-
nate in the public sphere of civil, political, and economic life.
90
International 
law, in general, and human rights law, in particular, was formed on the basis 
of these liberal distinctions in ways that perpetuate women’s inequality.
91
In 
practice, this means that “‘private’ issues are left to national, rather than in-
ternational, regulation.”
92
Many of these distinctions thus determine the is-
sues that receive international supervision and those that are left out of the 
international legal realm. Feminist writers have further observed that what is 
considered “public” in one context may be categorized as “private” in an-
87. In that regard, Charlesworth and Chinkin warn that “[t]he vulnerability of human 
rights law to non-observance is exacerbated when the law touches women’s lives.” Id. at 208; 
see also Robinson, supra note 16, vi (noting that “[f]ormal state and institutional support for 
the idea and language of human rights is overwhelming. [But]. . . [h]ow can the current inter-
national consensus on the human rights of women be translated into meaningful change? . . .
[W]e may well be entering into a new era of human rights and international law where the 
formal ‘success’ of feminists and other activists pose unexpected challenges to future 
change”).
88. See, e.g., Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of 
the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 73, at 85, 85; Karen 
Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights, in
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 148–50 (D.G. Dallmeyer 
ed., 1993).
89. Madhavi Sunder, Keeping Faith: Reconciling Women’s Human Rights and Reli-
gion, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 281, 282 (John Witte & Chris-
tian Green eds., 2013) (discussing the private/public distinction and how it influences wom-
en’s enjoyment of freedom of religion); see also Romany, supra note 76, at 87 (arguing that 
the public/private distinction has served to neglect protection of women’s rights in the private 
familial sphere).
90. Some feminist scholars have demonstrated that civil and political rights have been 
regarded as belonging to public life, while protection of rights in the private sphere of familial 
relationships has been neglected, and thus basic rights of women have suffered. See, e.g.,
Romany, supra note 76, at 87.
91. Id.; see also Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra
note 7, at 640 (arguing that the dichotomy between public and private worlds has undermined 
the operation of international law and has made “the work and needs of women invisible.”).
92. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 56.
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other, but women’s issues remain frequently construed as private and un-
touchable, often times justified by states on the basis of protection of family 
values.
93
Therefore, feminist studies of human rights law try to identify such 
distinctions to extend international legal regulation on matters that were 
wrongfully classified as private.
94
Feminist literature also elucidates many other deficiencies of human 
rights law when it comes to the protection of women’s rights including: the 
marginalization of women’s issues within “mainstream” human rights bod-
ies—that often outline the scope of protection of human rights without 
properly considering the possible implications for women;
95
the relatively 
weak provisions that ensure women’s equal rights in international instru-
ments, which, according to some scholars, has reduced the force of interna-
tional legal enforcement and implementation of these rights;
96
the ways in 
which women’s perspectives were excluded from the initial formation of the 
field.
97
Even in the middle of the twentieth century, in critical moments in 
the creation of international human rights law, a consistent feature remained 
the absence of women. For example, in 1945, the UN Charter, was among 
the first global instruments to recognize the importance of the protection of 
human rights by states, yet it was signed mostly by men (only four women 
signed the Charter out of 850 delegates).
98
These limitations show that the feminist perspective in human rights 
law is essential and relevant. Human rights law continues to be an important 
area for scrutiny.
99
Since the work of human rights bodies catalyzes consid-
93. Id. at 59; see also H. MOORE, FEMINISM AND ANTHROPOLOGY 54–59 (1988).
94. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 59.
95. The Human Rights Committee, for example, discusses the scope of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief in its general comments but has in many ways failed to properly 
address the increased risk for women in the enjoyment of their liberty to hold and manifest a 
belief of their choices. See Cochav Elkayam Levy, Where is God When We Need Her? Wom-
en’s Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief as Key to Promoting Gender Equality, 95 TUL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021); see also Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The New United 
Nations “Gender Architecture”: A Room with a View?, 17 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 2
(2013) (noting that the Human Rights Committee explains the scope of the right to life but is 
making no reference to the issue of infanticide); see also CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra 
note 7, at 218–20 (discussing the “[m]arginalization of women’s rights”).
96. See, e.g., Anne Bayefsky, Making the Human Rights Treaties Work, 26 STUD.
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 229 (1994); CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 220 
(noting that the operative language of the Women’s Convention is much weaker compared, 
for example, with the Race Convention).
97. See, e.g., Otto, supra note 16; see also CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7,
at 231–44 (exploring the development of human rights as men’s rights).
98. Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, Women and the UN Charter, 
SOAS UNIV. LONDON, https://www.soas.ac.uk/cisd/research/women-in-diplomacy/women-in-
the-un-charter/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2021).
99. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation on Economic Consequences of Marriage and its Dissolution: Concept Note,
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erable progress in advancing gender equality, the purpose of the feminist 
analysis in human rights law is not merely critical but also constructive 
(aiming to inspire developments that would achieve material improvements 
in women’s lives). The doctrine still has a long way to go before human 
rights law can become defined in new, fully inclusive ways.
III.  Feminist Methods in International Law
So far, this article has discussed feminist ideas in international law as if 
feminism is one unified theory. The reference to feminist legal theory as a 
unitary genre is, in the words of Nicola Lacey, a “necessary and useful de-
vice.” As she notes, “We need to generalize among feminist theories if we 
are going to engage in the project of characterizing the genre.”
100
Yet, it is 
more accurate to talk about legal feminisms. Despite the apparent common-
ality in the feminist endeavor, “‘feminism’ does not refer to a single theory”
or methodology.
101
Instead, a variety of feminist theories have been applied 
to accommodate the constructions of international law.
102
Identifying the 
dominant strands which inform feminist doing in law is empowering and 
critical to our understanding and commitment to the research in the field. 
The goal of this section is to discuss these theories and highlight their meth-
ods.
Christine Chinkin and Hillary Charlesworth first famously explored 
these strands in 2001; their analysis provided the bedrock of analysis for 
feminism in international law and serve as the basis of the analysis here.
This part explores four theoretical emphases of the main streams of 
thought in feminist legal theory, each of them of relevance to the discus-
sion of feminist methods: liberal feminism, cultural feminism, radical fem-
inism, and postmodern/intersectional feminisms. It distinguishes between 
the corresponding methods and between the set of questions that each ap-
proach challenges us to ask, then it applies each theory to a modern exam-
ple.
103
The different conceptual concerns of the various feminist theories 
complement each other and interrelate in many respects, but each lacks the 
ability to fully address women’s concerns. Understanding them each sepa-
rately creates a fuller picture of the challenges involved in achieving gender 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2009/II/WP.2/R (June 2009) (discussing the notable progress in the 
advancement of women’s rights in the area of family law).
100. Lacey, supra note 75, at 17.
101. Barak-Erez, supra note 11, at 86.
102. In their book, Charlesworth and Chinkin explain a range of feminist theories that 
could be used to reveal gender bias of international law sources and their scholarly work 
provides the groundwork for the exploration here. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra
note 7, at 38.
103. Hilary Charlesworth notes in this regard that “the technique of asking questions 
and challenging assumptions about international law may be more valuable than generating 
grand theories of women’s oppression. See Charlesworth, supra note 15, at 384.
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equality.
104
Of course, even these understandings offer only a glimpse into 
the existing varied and rich feminist discourse of legal academia.
A. Liberal Feminism – Seeking and Eliminating Differences
Liberal feminism relies on the idea that men and women are fundamen-
tally equal. It is rooted in philosophical and political liberal thought,
105
which centers on notions of individual autonomy, universal rights and de-
mocracy, and on the core belief that all people are created equal. Liberal 
theory advances the idea that the inherent nature of people mandates “equal 
treatment of all as a matter of legal, political, and moral right, irrespective of 
the particular characteristics” of the individual.
106
Based on this reasoning, 
early feminists argued that women ought to be treated as autonomous indi-
viduals and deserve equal rights under the law.
107
Liberal feminism thus of-
ten emphasizes that women can perform exactly as men, given identical 
opportunities.
108
It focuses on “equal opportunities and denies stereotypi-
cal distinctions between men and women.”
109
For liberal feminists, equali-
ty means equal treatment, trusting that women would reach their full po-
tential in society if they were treated in the same way as men.
As a result, liberal feminists target laws that discriminate against 
women. Such laws may prohibit women from actions which are permitted 
for men (such as voting, assuming public roles, acquiring education, in-
heriting property, enjoying certain public services). For liberal feminists, 
“A state’s role is to ensure that gender neutral laws exist and that women 
have access to the protection of these laws.”
110
They assume that a state can 
104. Diane Otto offers an interesting observation of feminist thought in international law 
suggesting that it is:
[M]ore useful, and apt, to think of feminist approaches to international law as a 
shifting and contested network of ideas and allegiances that, in seeking to make 
sex/gender a central analytical category, draw on multiple and sometimes compet-
ing feminist perspectives and engage with other critical traditions in law. This ap-
proach makes visible those less dominant feminist ideas that remain engaged in a 
variety of ways, providing an abundant reservoir of historical and theoretical 
knowledge, grounded analyses, and experiential evidence with the power to trouble 
masculinist certitudes.”
Otto, supra note 16, at 491–92.
105. For an overview of liberal feminism see Lacey, supra note 75, 19–22.
106. Adam Thurschwell, Radical Feminist Liberalism: At the Heart of Freedom: Femi-
nism, Sex, & Equality, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 745, 747 (1999); see also R. C. Preston & Ronald 
Z. Ahrens, United Nations Convention Documents in Light of Feminist Theory, 8 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 7 (2001).
107. See Thurschwell, supra note 106, at 749 (discussing autonomy of the individual as 
part of liberal philosophy in the context of feminism).
108. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 39.
109. Barak-Erez, supra note 11, at 86.
110. Preston & Ahrens, supra note 106, at 7.
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perform as a neutral actor, “free from gender bias and able to enforce the 
law equally to both men and women.”
111
The liberal feminist approach 
therefore insists on gender neutrality,112 and demands that the law fulfill 
its promise of objectivity and rationality.
113
It does not provide imagery of 
a different system but works to improve existing legal structures. For lib-
eral feminists, equality can be achieved if we invest enough effort. In this 
sense, “sexism is regarded as a bias that can be eliminated by more ration-
al inquiry.”
114
Liberal feminism has had a significant influence in international law 
contexts. The international community’s commitment to prohibiting sex-
based discrimination and eradicating biased norms is very much liberal in 
character.
115
Liberal feminism has influenced various international reforms 
and most often conceived of equality rights as prohibiting government ac-
tors from discriminating against women (rather than requiring a fuller un-
derstanding of the promise to gender equality and women’s enjoyment of 
real economic, social, cultural, and political power).
116
The focus on sex 
equality rights is apparent in the major human rights instruments which 
tend to employ a sameness model and seek gender neutral arrangements.
117
CEDAW is a useful example of feminist liberalism as well, as its provi-
sions largely focus on equal treatment.
118
Although CEDAW does go be-
yond liberal notions and represents more radical ideas of equality, it has 
generally continued the liberal tradition of equality by primarily seeking 
to abolish “discrimination against women.”
119
Therefore, as a method for a critical study of international law, liberal 
feminism advises that we focus on removing legal barriers that prevent 
equal treatment in the public sphere and on eliminating distinctions in the 
law between men and women with the goal of achieving gender neutrali-
111. Id.
112. See Barak-Erez, supra note 11, at 86.
113. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 38 (also noting that “liberal feminists 
typically accept the language and aims of the existing domestic legal order.”).
114. Id. at 40.
115. Id.; see also Hilary Charlesworth, What are Women’s International Human 
Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 73, at 58, 63–64.
116. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 229 (discussing the centrality of the 
norm of non-discrimination in international human rights law).
117. Id. at 213.
118. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/A/47/38 (1979), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a422.html [hereinafter CEDAW]; see also
MACKINNON, supra note 77 (noting that “most of CEDAW’s active provisions admittedly 
grant women equality of rights in gender-neutral ways).
119. CEDAW, supra note 118, art. 1.
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ty.120 Knowing that the law was created mostly by men, liberal feminists 
begin by questioning the law’s claim for objectivity.
121
Liberal feminists 
see the male-orientation of the law as a methodological problem which 
“once identified, can be eradicated.”
122
In other words, in a feminist legal 
analysis of international law, the methodological goal of liberal feminism 
is to achieve neutral legal outcomes by challenging differences and dis-
tinctions that discriminate against women. The liberal approach continues 
to play a particularly important role in the global arena, which is unfortu-
nately still very much preoccupied with combating domestic recognition 
of traditional discriminatory legal distinctions between men and women 
and of religious laws that frequently restrict women’s freedoms in many 
countries around the world.
123
However, critics of the liberal approach argue that it does not take 
women very far in their global aspirations for equality.
124
First, identifying 
differentiation as a method may overlook areas where there are justified 
reasons to acknowledge differences.
125
For example, pregnancy or mother-
hood are mostly not considered a justification for treating women differ-
ently by traditional liberal feminists.
126
Because of this, Charlesworth and 
Chinkin, for example, note that “the approach of insisting that women and 
men be treated similarly falters when women and men are not in the same 
position either because of physical difference or because of structural dis-
120. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 39.
121. Id. at 40.
122. Id. at 40 (noting Sandra Harding’s observation that “bad law is the problem, not 
law-as-usual”).
123. See, e.g., Heiner Bielefeldt (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief), 
Addressing the Interplay of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Equality between Men and 
Women, U.N. Doc. A/68/290, ¶ 32 (Dec. 26, 2013) (referring generally to conflicts between 
gender equality and freedom of religion); see also Abdelfattah Amor (Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief), Study on Freedom or Belief and the Status of Women in the 
Light of Religion and Traditions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/73/Add.2 (Apr. 24, 2009) (noting 
that “at the dawn of this third millennium, many women across the world suffer discrimina-
tion in their private and family lives and in relation to their status in society. Such discrimina-
tion, which is deeply rooted in the dominant culture of some countries, is largely based on or 
imputed to religion. It is often trivialized and tolerated by the State or society and sometimes 
sanctioned by law. In some cases, it assumes very cruel forms and denies women their most 
fundamental rights, such as the right to life, integrity or dignity.”).
124. See, e.g., Nicola Lacey, Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from A 
Feminist Perspective, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 411, 415–20 (1987); see also Introduction, in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 5 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Ro-
sanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (explaining that equality rights doctrine provides a problematic 
foundation for legal reform).
125. Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1122 (1986).
126. Id.; see also Barak-Erez, supra note 11, 91–92.
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advantage.”
127
Second, the liberal method’s focus on non-discrimination 
requires women to conform to existing male-defined societal norms that 
perpetuate inequality. As such, it essentially demands that women aspire 
to become “the same as men,” thus turning themselves into the less de-
sired standard.
128
The liberal approach strives for a somewhat limited legal 
reform that would guarantee that women are treated equally, yet without 
necessarily addressing women’s own specific needs, life conditions, and 
experiences. Finally, feminists have been skeptical of the very idea of 
gender neutrality in law and legal analysis. Lacey, for example, questions 
the analytic integrity of liberalism’s promise to gender-neutral legal con-
structions. She has warned that in a world in which sex and gender contin-
ue to exist as a basis for social differentiation which notoriously affect 
women, gender-neutral language falsely constructs the law as neutral and 
just.
129
In relation to international law, Lacey asks whether universal human 
rights instruments need to be replaced or supplemented in certain areas to 
recognize special rights to women or other groups (such as collective re-
medial rights that would promise affirmative action).
130
Thus, although the 
liberal feminist perspective seeks gender neutrality, it may entail dispro-
portionate burdens on women and conceal certain privileges of social 
groups that enjoy political and social power.
131
Liberal feminists might 
overlook instances in which the law lacks specific reference to women or 
circumstances in which more fundamental, transformative structural and
legal changes are needed.
Lastly, a general feminist critique of liberal thought confronts the very 
fundamental reliance of liberalism on private and public distinctions.
132
Liberal theories assume that civil, political and economic issues belong to 
127. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 39; see also CATHARINE 
MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND THE LAW 32 (1987) (noting that following the logic of equality and 
nondiscrimination doctrine, pregnancy is a difference which leads to the ironic result that giv-
ing women what they need is discriminatory).
128. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 38 (claiming that equality doctrine and the reli-
ance on preventing sex discrimination has been utterly ineffective in attending to women’s
needs and especially to the need to respond to unequal and abusive social conditions that exit 
for women). In addition, according to Nicola Lacey, the liberal approach only allows wom-
en access to a world that is already being dominated by men. She further notes that sex and 
gender have shaped the world in ways that have been unjust not only in differentiation but 
in domination, oppression and discrimination. NICOLA LACEY, supra note 124, at 420; 
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 40.
129. NICOLA LACEY, Feminist Legal Theory Beyond Neutrality, in UNSPEAKABLE 
SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL THEORY 188 (1998).
130. See Lacey, supra note 75, at 22.
131. Lacey, supra note 124, at 415–20.
132. For a detailed discussion of liberal feminism and this criticism, see, e.g., LACEY,
supra note 129, at 191; Lacey, supra note 75, at 19–20.
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the public-regulated world, while private lives and spheres are subject to 
minimal state intervention and exclusively serve and mandate respect to 
the autonomous individual and individual freedoms. Feminists have ar-
gued such distinctions have left many concerns regarding women’s lives 
and regarding the protection of women’s rights within private spheres -
rendering them invisible - and outside the ambit of international law, in-
cluding, for instance, in areas such as familial relationships and domestic 
violence.
133
Yet, despite critiques, liberal feminism’s goal to achieve gen-
der-neutral outcomes and to eradicate discriminatory legal distinctions 
continues to inspire significant reforms in many countries around the 
world in which women suffer from traditional discriminatory laws and 
practices.
B. Cultural Feminism – Questioning the Masculinity of Legal Rules and 
Searching for Feminine Modes of Justice
Cultural feminism argues that women are inherently different from 
men. It focuses on perspectives that have been identified as unique to 
women (though not necessarily promoting an essentialist argument).
134
It 
brings attention to the “different voice” of women,
135
emphasizing their ad-
herence to an “ethic of care.”
136
According to cultural feminists, “women 
reason differently than men,” and often “prioritize values of nurturing, car-
ing, conciliation, and responsibility.”
137
Some cultural feminists seek to ex-
133. The CEDAW does not explicitly mention the term “domestic violence.” This issue 
has been brought to global attention only thanks to the tireless work of feminist activists and 
the members of the CEDAW Committee. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARDS A 
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 187–90 (1989) (suggesting that the “public,” state, govern-
ment, and the law, are constructed as the opposite of the family, which has been associated 
with the private sphere. MacKinnon argues for greater regulation of matters involving home 
and family); see Lacey, supra note 75, at 21–22 (discussing feminist criticism of liberal theo-
ry).
134. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (3d ed., 2003). See generally CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra 
note 7, at 40.
135. See GILLIGAN, supra note 134.  As expounded by Chalreswoth and Chinkin, Carol 
Gilligan, a professor of psychology at New York University, has been instrumental in devel-
oping this school of thought. Her famous work “In a Different Voice,” found that while boys 
tend to be more abstract and rational, girls demonstrate more contextual reasoning and tend to 
express values of caring and empathy. The problem she identified is that psychological theo-
ries valued the masculine mode of reasoning as more morally developed and mature, whereas 
feminine reasoning was considered inferior in many ways. Her work inspired legal scholars to 
argue that the law gives similar preference to masculinity and to masculine ideas. 
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 40.
136. GILLIGAN, supra note 134 (arguing that many women handle problems from an 
“ethic of care” rather than a sense of justice); see, e.g., VIRGINIA HELD, FEMINIST MORALITY:
TRANSFORMING CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS (1993); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A
FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984).
137. Preston & Ahrens, supra note 106, at 8; see generally GILLIGAN, supra note 134.
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plore, for example, “women’s culture” repressed feminine attributes, or oth-
er women’s values.
138
They argue that women may also reach moral deci-
sions differently and have different ideas than men concerning justice.
139
Cultural feminism in this sense is not concerned with culture but with cul-
turally associated qualities particular to women. The cultural approach has 
been highly influential in feminist legal theory. Unlike liberal feminism, it 
recognizes the need to emphasize that women have different qualities than 
those of men. Cultural feminists, in fact, believe that the law and the legal 
system should not only acknowledge but also celebrate these differences.
140
Cultural feminism lays the claim that the current traditional schemes of 
justice are male-oriented and marginalize women’s ethical and moral con-
victions. It criticizes the hierarchal organization of law, its adversarial 
format, and its aim toward abstract resolution of competing rights.
141
Ap-
plied to international law, cultural feminism as a method questions the 
masculinity of international legal rules, seeks the voice of women in all of 
their diversity, while simultaneously devising feminine modes of justice.
The cultural feminist method includes understanding how ideas of mascu-
linity and femininity shape the law. Cultural feminism aspires to inclusivi-
ty, femininity, and diversity.  Cultural feminists are not necessarily essen-
tialists but operate from the understanding that women’s voices were 
missing for too long, and their concerns were considered illegitimate. 
Thus, a cultural feminist method seeks to bring these voices and encour-
age inclusive dialogue.
Cultural feminist claims have motivated feminist jurists, for example, 
to challenge adversarial legal procedures popular in mainstream Western 
systems and to propose alternatives to adversarial litigation such as media-
tion and conciliation processes, which have gained recognition and respect 
138. See NODDINGS, supra note 136; Nel Noddings, The Language of Care Ethics,
KNOWLEDGE QUEST 52 (2012). Nicola Lacey refers to cultural feminists as a branch of radi-
cal feminism, seeing them as seeking to embrace an “essential” sex difference approach to 
emphasize that “women’s natural nurturing role in bearing and rearing children gives them a 
distinctive empathy with others and the world” while others assert a more historical or psy-
choanalytic perspective. Lacey, supra note 128, at 23.
139. Preston & Ahrens, supra note 106, at 8.
140. Id. at 8 (“Cultural Feminism’s goal does not lie in merely identifying the unique 
traits of women – traditional patriarchy has already done that – but in celebrating them and 
recognizing them as strengths.”).
141. See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER 
SCHNEIDER & MICHAEL MOFFITT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL 
MODEL (3d ed., 2019); CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 40 (noting that cultural 
feminists identify that “the language and imagery of the law underscore its maleness: it lays 
claim to rationality, objectivity and abstractness, characteristics traditionally associated with 
men, and is defined in contrast to emotion, subjectivity and contextualized thinking – the 
province of women.”).
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in the international arena.
142
For example, a cultural feminist approach can 
be seen as critically important for some scholars in the easement of con-
flicts, such as in the case of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.
143
Northern 
Irish women’s “soft way of doing hard things” has been widely credited as 
leading to the success of the Good Friday Agreement.
144
However, cultural feminism is controversial. Charlesworth, for exam-
ple, notes that taking cultural feminism too far might confine all women to 
particular modes of reasoning and men to another.
145
Additionally, radical 
feminism, discussed in the next section, points out the risks in using “fem-
inine” methods to resolve disputes between two parties in genuinely une-
qual positions and stresses that these methods may perpetuate inequality 
instead of improving women’s status.
146
MacKinnon warns that the “femi-
nine” voice of women is currently defined by a patriarchal culture and not 
by women themselves. Therefore, affirming women’s differences may 
mean affirming their powerlessness.
147
Relying on stereotypes about wom-
en’s nature could inadvertently reinforce problematic gender norms. That 
said, it is important to stress that cultural feminism has the power to ex-
pose and transform many hidden social assumptions about the role of men 
and women in our society. It is also an empowering method that legitimiz-
es the voices of women, creating a space for new conceptions of justice 
and novel theories of human development.
C. Radical Feminism – Identifying and Confronting Male Domination 
over Women
Radical feminism explains women’s inequality in terms of power, 
namely, as a result of men’s domination over women.
148
It concentrates on 
the differences in power between men and women and critiques “not only 
142. See, e.g., MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 141; Lynne N. Henderson, supra 
note 144; Kate McCabe, A Forum for Women’s Voices: Mediation Through a Feminist Juris-
prudential Lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 459, 472 (2001); YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE PEACEFUL 
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (2018).
143. See Amanda E. Donahoe, “Wee Women’s Work:” Women and Peacebuilding in 
Northern Ireland (Jan. 1, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. Denver), 
https://www.nirwn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Wee-Womens-Work-Women-and-
Peacebuilding-in-Northern-Ireland.pdf.
144. Catherine Turner, Soft Ways of Doing Hard Things: Women Mediators and the 
Question of Gender in Mediation, 8 PEACEBUILDING 383, 395 (2020).
145. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Approaches to International Law, AUDIOVISUAL 
LIBR. INT’L L. (Jan. 6, 2012), https://legal.un.org/avl/ls/Charlesworth_IL.html#.
146. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 42; see e.g., HILARY ASTOR &
CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA 109–12 (1992).
147. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 39.
148. See, e.g., id. at 32; MACKINNON, supra note 133; MACKINNON, supra note 77. For 
a discussion on radical feminism see CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 42–44.
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physical power, but social, cultural, economic and sexual power as well.”
149
For radical feminists, sex is a distinction, and sexual difference is a social 
construction, more radical in defining social positioning than other distinc-
tions, such as race, class, or ethnic differences.
150
In this sense, because sex 
presupposes difference and equality assumes sameness, the entire doctrine 
of sex equality is understood by radical feminists as a contradiction in 
terms, an oxymoron, in ways that explain why attempts to promote sexual 
equality or equal rights for women continue to fail.
151
The most problematic 
feature that they identify in this doctrine is that its ultimate goal is that 
women be the same as men. Men become the standard for women and for 
the human more generally.
152
By contrast, radical feminists pose that in our 
quest for a gender just society we ought to demand that women, and essen-
tially persons of all genders, will not be socially prevented from experienc-
ing, on the basis of a condition of birth, physical and economic security, 
self-expression, respect and dignity, and will be granted equal power in so-
cial life. This leads radical feminist to center their efforts on fighting the 
most pervasive gender-based abuses and on improving women’s material 
desperation.
153
Radical feminism is the result of the contributions of many prominent 
scholars, but most identified with the work of MacKinnon,
154
who argues 
that when considering the differences between men and women in the law, 
we should actually focus on the question of power and its unequal distribu-
tion.155 MacKinnon conceived a theory of male dominance over women that 
is based upon social construction. In MacKinnon’s work, women’s oppres-
sion is a structural social relation of subordination in ways that render sex 
difference similar to Marxist ideas of class difference.
156
She contends that 
sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism—that which is most one’s
own but most taken away by the social relations, the theories criticize.
157
In 
her view, female sexuality was constructed by men for their pleasure and 
149. Preston & Ahrens, supra note 106, at 9; see also Lacey, supra note 75, at 23.
150. See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: To-
ward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1982).
151. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 34–35.
152. Id. at 32–34 (“ . . . man has become the measure of all things. Under the sameness 
standard, women are measured according to our correspondence with man, our equality 
judged by our proximity to his measure.”).
153. Id. at 32–45
154. For the most influential work of Radical Feminism in legal scholarship, see
MACKINNON, supra note 133; MACKINNON, supra note 77; MACKINNON, supra note 159. 
See also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. (1988); Wendy Wil-
liams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 151 (1992).
155. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 39.
156. Id. at 48.
157. Id.
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benefit and persists by social processes that appear neutral, universal, or 
even objective.
158
According to radical feminists, the law echoes the power 
relations between men and women. It reflects the power that men have and 
which is used to oppress women.
159
As MacKinnon points out, the law has 
been designed to keep women “out and down” by defending and enforcing 
a hierarchical system based on gender and sex that treats women as an infe-
rior class.
160
Radical feminism has challenged both the work of liberal and cultural 
feminists. From a radical lens, the liberal conception of feminism and 
equality for women involves acceptance of and adherence to existing soci-
etal norms of male dominance.
161
Radical feminists criticize liberal femi-
nism for adopting masculine measures to define women’s lives and for 
demanding that women essentially fight for equality only to be the same 
as men.
162
Additionally, for radical feminists, the cultural feminist ap-
proach may also fail when it does not consider women’s subordination. In 
radical feminism, feminine qualities, such as caring, are certainly not in-
herent or chosen by women but were imposed on women within the con-
text of the patriarchal societies in which they live and assigned to women 
from a masculine view of women’s personhood.
163
Because both liberal 
and cultural feminism fail to take into account the societal structures 
which created gendered norms, radical feminism argues either approach 
fails to fully capture the experience of being a woman. As MacKinnon 
bluntly argues: “Take your foot off our necks; then we will see in what 
tongue women speak.”
164
Radical feminists ultimately envision a world where women have equal 
power in social life.
165
They stress the liberation of women from unequal 
and abusive conditions. Radical feminism’s most central goal is to liberate 
women from subjection to violence and societal subordination to men.
166
From a radical perspective, feminist efforts for social, political, or legal re-
form should concentrate on women’s freedom from systematic subordina-
tion.167 As long as dominance and structural sex difference continues to be 
158. MacKinnon, supra note 150, at 658.
159. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 40–45; see also CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, su-
pra note 7, at 42–43 (according to the authors, radical feminism understands inequality as 
“political and sexual in nature.”).
160. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 205.
161. Id. at 34.
162. Id. at 33.
163. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 42.
164. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 45.
165. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 45.
166. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 11, at 89.
167. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 43.
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the main obstacle to overcome, other goals appear peripheral or, at least, 
not similarly important.
Applied to international law, radical feminism is thus not concerned 
with “theoretical equality or rights guaranteed on paper”
168
but, rather, with 
ensuring the very fundamental, even physical, ability of women to enjoy 
their rights and opportunities, requiring defining new paradigms to ensure 
women obtain real power.
169
Radical feminists have focused their attention 
in three main areas: (1) women’s reproductive capacity, including a wom-
an’s right to have an abortion, to receive full access to birth control, and to 
have complete control over her body; (2) eliminating violence against wom-
en and gender-based crimes; and (3) confronting traditional/institutional 
power structures.
170
As a result, radical feminists have led global efforts to eradicate vio-
lence against women. Through the radical feminist lens, violence is “a
means by which men keep women from attaining power.”
171
These efforts 
have proved particularly successful in international human rights law and 
international criminal law.
172
Radical feminists have also targeted pornogra-
phy, rape, sexual harassment, and physical abuse as forms of dominance 
that block women from assuming real societal equality.
173
Thanks to their 
work, it is now globally accepted that violence against women is one of the 
168. See Preston & Ahrens, supra note 106, at 10.
169. See MACKINNON, supra note 77; see also id. (explaining that according to radical 
feminists “it is not enough for women to have the same potential opportunities as men. Wom-
en are not equal, unless they are able to take advantage of those opportunities, define them 
outside the male paradigm, and thereby obtain real power. Dominance Feminists demand ac-
tual social, legal, and economic equality, not just the vague assurance of equal opportunity. 
They argue that the current male-based social systems, designed by men to ensure that men 
retain power, will never provide true equality for women.”).
170. MACKINNON, supra note 77.
171. Id. at 12; see also MACKINNON, supra note 77, at 28.
172. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic 
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 291–367 (1994); Christine Chinkin, 
Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 326, 328 (1994); 
KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 4–5, 18 (1997); Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: 
Integrating Crimes against Women into International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217,
220 (2000); G.A. Res. 48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(Dec. 20, 1993); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. 
A/47/38 (Jan. 29, 1992); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Erad-
ication of Violence Against Women, adopted June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M 960 (entered into force 
Mar. 5, 1995); Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women, opened for signature May 11, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210 (entered into force Aug. 1, 
2014); Rashida Manjoo, (Special Rapporteur) Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/49 (May 14, 2013).
173. MACKINNON, supra note 77.
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main obstacles to gender equality.
174
Another essential reform motivated by
radical efforts is the global recognition of sexual harassment as a legally 
defined form of discrimination against women.
175
Radical feminists have also deeply influenced international legal 
scholarship by exposing the ways in which public and private dichotomies 
legitimize male domination over women.
176
One radical feminism claim, 
for example, is that the exclusion and subordination of women often occur 
when “private” matters are left for national regulation rather than interna-
tional, or accepted as issues that are in the power of the state rather than 
other entities (i.e. global institutes, regional authorities or civil society or-
ganizations).
177
MacKinnon articulates this line of critique as such:
The international structure has emerged as a set of interesting boxes 
defined by layers upon layers of distinctions between public and 
private. The public is formally supreme over the private, the private 
a space inside where power is left alone by public authorities. 
Women have historically been relegated to and identified with the 
private, excluded from and, when present, subordinated in the pub-
lic.
178
Radical feminists identify issues such as family matters as subjects 
generally associated by states with the private domain, which deserves lit-
tle attention or international supervision.
179
To illustrate, states often rely 
on religious and cultural traditions, which are considered as belonging to the 
private domain, to allow the subordination of women.
180
As a response,
174. See Preston & Ahrens, supra note 106, at 12 (discussing how radical feminists fo-
cus on each of these issues and can largely take credit for increased social awareness and ac-
tion taken to remedy them).
175. See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
176. MACKINNON, supra note 77, at 1–17. The foundational discussion of this theme 
appears in Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 
625–30. See, e.g., CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 43;
177. See, e.g., CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 56.
178. MACKINNON, supra note 77, at 4.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Christina M. Cema & Jennifer C. Wallace, Women and Culture, in 
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 623, 646 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. 
Koenig eds., 1999) (detailing the discrimination women face due to culture and emphasizing 
that “States have used this distinction [between public and private] to the disadvantage of 
women by asserting that certain harmful practices are cultural traditions, and thus outside of 
the realm of human rights law”); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 
1402 (2002) (emphasizing claims that in our reality religion has become an “extralegal field”
pushed to the private sphere); see also David Kennedy, Images of Religion in Legal Theory, in 
RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 145, 149 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999) 
(discussing the history of religion and international law). Other feminist scholars have similar-
ly demonstrated that civil and political rights have been regarded as belonging to public life, 
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some scholars, including MacKinnon, have demanded expanding public 
regulation of the “private” sphere to ensure the protection of women’s
rights.
181
Turning to discuss its methods, radical feminism seeks to expose the 
hidden power relations in international law. By showing how the law re-
flects male standards, radical feminists aspire to reveal “the woman’s
standpoint,” as opposed to the currently enforced male standpoint.
182
The 
distinct method suggested by radical feminism is to identify and confront 
the ways by which women are oppressed by male dominance. As a method 
of inquiry, radical feminists encourage feminist international lawyers to 
concentrate on the most systematic human rights violations and risk situa-
tions in women’s lives,
183
studying the roots of women’s oppression, be-
cause it is in these situations where domination is preserved. Feminist 
analysis of the international legal system should determine, for example, 
whether a global norm, policy, or practice contributes to the unequal dis-
tribution of power based on gender. MacKinnon’s dominance approach 
involves looking for those behaviors or legal rules that appear most natu-
ral and common, asking ourselves whether they conceal relationships of 
subordination. Power structures are often deeply ingrained by the law, in 
ways that makes them almost invisible. Hence, according to radical femi-
nism, national and international legal strategies that expose unidentified 
hazards that women suffer should be at the heart of feminist work in inter-
national law.
184
Like all theories, radical feminism has its critics.
185
Some opponents 
argue that it is nearly impossible to identify an authentic women’s voice in 
MacKinnon’s male-dominated world.
186
Her negation of women’s person-
hood in the present is considered a limiting move in itself.
187
Additionally, 
some claim that radical feminism’s approach to women’s equality deems 
issues such as race and class as secondary.
188
Finally, as powerful and 
convincing radical feminism’s theory is, it may constrict us to viewing 
while protection of rights in the private sphere of familial relationships has been neglected, 
and thus basic rights of women have suffered. See, e.g., Romany, supra note 76, at 100–01.
181. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 133, at 193.
182. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 150, at 637.
183. MACKINNON, supra note 127, at 103–04.
184. See also CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 43 (for example, the authors 
mention uncovering the harms of sexual harassment and pornography); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, To Change the World for Women, in BUTTERFLY POLITICS 11 (2017).
185. For consideration of some of these critiques, see, e.g., Lacey, supra note 75, at 24;
186. See, e.g., CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 77 (1989).
187. See, e.g., id.
188. See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 75, at 24 (pointing to the limited substantive focus of 
radical feminism); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 580, 591–92 (1990), as described in CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 
7, at 43.
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women as victims of male domination, rather than powerful and autono-
mous change agents in society with control over their lives.
189
In highlight-
ing women’s oppression, it might fall into the trap of preserving patriar-
chal images of women. Still, radical feminism remains the most influential 
and thought-provoking strand in contemporary feminist legal scholarship.
D. Postmodern and Intersectional Feminisms - Considering Context, 
Women from Different Backgrounds and Compounding Experiences of 
Discrimination
Postmodern and intersectional feminisms are concerned with women’s
multiple identities and represent a spectrum of feminisms that challenge the 
partiality of feminist Western thought as well as the multitude of injustices 
that women and people of all genders may experience.
190
They strive to 
broaden feminist ideology by disrupting the Western conventions on which 
it too often rests.
191
They challenge feminists to see beyond the model of the 
“middle-class, educated white feminist,” and warn feminists against making 
generalizations about women across the world.
192
Post-modern feminists re-
ject universalizing grand theories and instead embrace the notion of a more 
contextualized and inclusive analysis of women’s situations.
193
This critique, 
which emerges in different forms by postmodern, third world, Black, queer, 
and intersectional feminisms is very much a reaction to both radical and lib-
eral feminism, and the primary claim made is that there is no single true sto-
ry about women all over the world.
194
Instead, we have to be sensitive to 
particular contexts of women, to oppression based on race and imperialism, 
and to local issues related to women’s lives.
189. See Lacey, supra note 75, at 24.
190. This includes Third World feminism. Nicola Lacey refers to feminist criticisms 
about the need to address the reality of women from different backgrounds as “difference fem-
inisms.” For a fuller analysis of these critiques see id. at 25–27; see also CHARLESWORTH &
CHINKIN, supra note 7 at 44–48 (discussing postmodern and third world feminisms).
191. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 
AT CENTURY’S END 141–42 (1995) (noting that postmodern feminists promote the notion of 
plurality and multiple viewpoints).
192. See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, Human Rights in the 21st Century: Take a Walk on the 
Dark Side, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 665, 679–85 (2006) (arguing that feminists must understand 
and learn from the postcolonial engagement with rights to understand the situations of Third 
World women); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Poli-
cies, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) (arguing that feminist theory must account for the ways 
that race and gender intersect to affect women’s experiences).
193. See, e.g., SMART, supra note 186, at 68–69.
194. See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 192 (1986);
Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the Native Subject in In-
ternational/Postcolonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (2002); Mary 
Joe Frug, Commentary, A Postmoderm Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1992).
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Post-modern and intersectional feminists, for instance, express concern 
about the role of law in identity-constituting and in maintaining and con-
structing power-relations between social and ethnic groups.
195
Charlesworth 
and Chinkin explain that postmodern feminism is “sceptical [sic] of mod-
ernist, universal theoretical explanations of the oppression of women and 
embraces ‘the fractured identities. . . [of] modern life.’”
196
This concept is 
also closely linked to that of intersectional feminists who center on overlap-
ping experiences of discrimination and point to the ways in which people’s
various social identities exacerbate inequality, extend across generations, 
and deepen oppression.
197
Third world feminism, queer feminism, and other 
third wave streams similarly reveal the necessity to engage with the ways 
inequalities intersect with one another and deny people their rights and 
equal opportunities in forms much more complex than ever thought (includ-
ing race, poverty, indigenous status, and gender identity).
198
As Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty has argued, Western feminism has led to the creation of 
the “Third World Woman,” an ideological and overly reductive representa-
tion of womanhood in developing countries.
199
The idea of incorporating the complexity of multiple oppressions into 
feminist discourse has had a tremendous impact on feminist theory, motivat-
ing many scholars to respond to this difficult challenge.
200
In international 
legal scholarship, postmodern and intersectional feminisms triggered argu-
ments against universal legal concepts and attempts to theorize the global 
situation of women, challenging if such broad endeavors would be useful in 
achieving gender equality in a reality in which the law itself often “disquali-
fies women’s accounts and experiences.”
201
An emphasis on localized narratives and human experience is charac-
teristic of postmodern and intersectional feminist legal methods. As  
methods, they encourage contextual inquiry – of the particular contexts and 
realities of women from different backgrounds. As an example, post-
modern feminist legal scholars question international law’s ability to recog-
nize the differences between individual women’s experiences, such as those 
in previously colonies countries and those who are religious.
202
Postmodern 
and intersectional feminisms critiques suggest addressing women’s multiple 
identities paying special “attention to language and the way that [the law or 
195. See, e.g., Nicola Lacey, supra note 75, at 26; MINDA, supra note 191, at 143.
196. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 44.
197. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245–46 (1991).
198. See e.g., Janet Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, in GENDER AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 57; Ratna Kapur, supra note 192.
199. CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS 40 (2003).
200. See SMART, supra note 186, at 68.
201. Id. at 86, as described in CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 44–45.
202. Kapur, supra note 192, at 684–85.
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legal language] filters out women’s experiences and understanding”
203
as 
well as focusing greater attention on dynamics of overlapping concurrent 
forms of discrimination.
204
Applied to international law, postmodern and intersectional feminisms 
inquiries offer to explore the ability of the international legal system, in its 
current structure, to motivate social reform. They are especially aware of the 
diversity of women and encourages searching for ways to include considera-
tion of specific group affiliations such as ethnic origin.
205
A method worth consideration here is that of “world traveling” which 
has been developed by Isabelle Gunning to encourage a multicultural dia-
logue.
206
Charlesworth recommends Gunning’s method for analysis of inter-
national law, explaining that it involves “being explicit about our own his-
torical and cultural background, trying to understand how other women 
might see us, and recognizing the complexities of the lives of other wom-
en.”
207
Similarly, intersectionality asks that we consider the diverse ethnic, 
cultural, and historical backgrounds of a person; it requires us to search for 
intersecting forms of discrimination in international rules and to expose 
their compounded negative impact on the women and persons of all genders 
concerned.
While intersectional feminism has been broadly accepted, the post-
modern feminism has had its critics.
208
It has been argued that the local-
ized narratives adopted by postmodern feminism may weaken the interna-
tional human rights discourse, making it too frail to respond to the global 
oppression of women.
209
As a result, several attempts have been made to 
address the range of postmodern critiques, including by embracing an ec-
lectic approach that accepts, for instance, that several approaches can be 
applied in feminist legal analyses.
210
More generally, postmodern and inter-
sectional feminists continue to challenge the ability of international legal 
203. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 45.
204. MacKinnon, supra note 2; see also INTERSECTIONALITY: SPECIAL ISSUE, 13 EUR.
J. WOMEN’S STUD. (Ann Phoenix & Pamela Pattynama eds. 2006).
205. See e.g., Kapur, supra note 192.
206. See Isabelle Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural 
Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 189–
248 (1991).
207. Charlesworth, Talking to Ourselves, supra note 7, at 32.
208. MacKinnon provides an interesting analysis of postmodern critiques questioning 
many arguments that were made by postmodernists about feminist theory. See MACKINNON, 
supra note 77, at 44–63.
209. See MINDA, supra note 191, at 144–47 (critiques of postmodernism express “worry 
that the localized narratives of postmodernism are too ‘anemic’ to do anything about the struc-
tural problems posed by gender hierarchy.” The argument is made that only large narratives 
can motivate transformative changes in law and society.).
210. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 45–46.
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rules to respond to the issues and concerns of women from different tradi-
tional, social, ethnic, religious, or political statuses.
E. Possible Challenges
The theories and methods explored thus far add valuable insights to the 
study of gender as a category of analysis in international law. They broaden 
the feminist perspective of the international legal system and offer different 
techniques to engage with the rules, institutions, and global norms more 
critically. Elements from these different approaches can be found in most 
feminist projects in international law. The varied strands in feminist thought 
also demonstrate an intellectual richness of the discourse on women’s equal-
ity. Feminist theories provide many opportunities for scholars in the field of 
international law who wish to tackle gender inequality. At the same time, 
however, they also present certain challenges.
Once the main feminist methods are understood and fully appreciated, 
the greatest challenge is that different feminist methods may lead in very 
different directions. For instance, traditional liberal feminism suggests tar-
geting and eliminating differences between men and women in hope to 
achieve gender-neutral legal outcomes. Cultural feminism values the task of 
distinguishing between men and women - finding women’s different voice -
to identify new “feminine” legal methods for resolving conflicts and for re-
defining international legal concepts. In contrast, radical feminism would 
point to areas of male power that preserve the subordinate position of wom-
en and draw attention to ways out of male dominance. And postmodern 
feminism would question the very suitability of international law to respond 
to women’s inequality, emphasizing the blindness of international law to 
additional identities, experiences, oppressions, leading the idea that interna-
tional law is based on Western ideologies and ideals.
211
This means that the 
challenge for some international scholars does not end with embracing a 
feminist perspective. Instead, the challenge begins with the attempt to 
choose one of these alternatives and to determine which feminist approach 
to prioritize. The next part suggests a different route to this choice.
IV. A Question of Impact – Asking THE WOMAN QUESTION in 
International Law
A. Making Gender Matter
Every study that considers gender as an essential category for examina-
tion, whether alone or alongside other categories, is feminist. Attaching sig-
211. Cf. Barak-Erez, supra note 11, at 90 (in the context of legal interpretation, Barak-
Erez argues that feminist interpretive approaches “carry the potential of intensifying the con-
flicts between feminists because they import into the interpretive arena the bitter controversies 
of the various feminist schools of thought.”).
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nificance to questions about gender means believing that it can produce out-
comes that may have significant progressive consequences for our human 
knowledge. This type of study entails assuming that our world is not neutral 
and objective until we invest efforts to make it such. The method of asking 
the woman question does just that: It regards gender as important and an in-
dicator of possible gaps in the law. The woman question is a constant search 
for the gender implications of the law.
212
While the various feminist ap-
proaches are critically important, this part shall suggest that there is a need 
for a clearer overarching method that would allow a more accessible gen-
der-based scrutiny of international law as well as an examination of possible 
legal strategies to secure justice for women. As shall be seen, the woman 
question corresponds with this dual goal.
The woman question seeks to amend injustices wherever those are
found. Or, put differently, the woman question seeks all of the justices 
sought by the different feminist theories. It offers a common ground for 
feminist legal analysis that does not entail adhering to one ideology but ra-
ther relies on the basic assumption in contemporary feminist legal theory 
that “the ways in which sex/gender has shaped the world, including through 
law, have been unjust.”
213
This question differs from the various feminist approaches described 
thus far in that it returns to the core quest of legal feminism, which is to ex-
pose the impact of the law on women. Unlike the methods explored above, 
it does not assume anything but the fact that the law may operate differently 
with respect to women and may influence them in ways that could result in
inequality.
The decision to employ this method and to show how it can be applied 
in international legal contexts developed during my work on global and lo-
cal conflicts around women’s religious freedoms, examining the influence 
of religion on the design of human rights law and its response to women’s
concerns.
214
At a certain point during my study of feminist theories in inter-
national law, it seemed that the simple decision to apply a feminist perspec-
tive in my work was a challenge. It was not because of the need to get ac-
quainted with feminist theories. (I did that enthusiastically). It presented a 
challenge, because I had to navigate between competing commitments, as 
well as reckon with what seemed like a deepening contestation between the 
various strands and their multiple methods (the latter sometimes defined as 
212. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 837 (“Feminists across many disciplines regularly ask a 
question – a set of questions, really – known as the “woman question,” which is designed to 
identify the gender implications of rules and practices which might otherwise appear to be 
neutral or objective.”). This method can be expanded to research studies that seek to avoid the 
gender binary and refer to the gender question in ways that take into consideration a spectrum 
of genders and the impact of the law on people of all genders. It can be applied in a wide 
range of areas of international law.
213. Lacey, supra note 75, at 16.
214. Elkayam Levy, supra note 95.
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such and often not).
215
The choice to investigate how gender may have 
shaped international law seemed to require making an excruciating decision 
(especially for a young scholar) about what would be the most appropriate 
feminist approach. The deeper I delved into feminist theories, the harder the 
decision became. As an international lawyer, there was another significant 
aspect for my research to consider, which was the sense of obligation to de-
vise practical outcomes that would be responsive to any gaps I might find in 
protecting women’s rights. For many of us, the feminist project in interna-
tional law does not end with a critique of the law. Global norms are used by 
activists all around the world to protect women and to mobilize social 
change at the domestic level. International lawyers take for granted that, to 
varying degrees, international law constantly affects and has the power to 
positively influence national laws and policies in multiple ways.
216
There-
fore, our work, though critical of the law, remains constructive.
217
Looking at the several methods explored in the previous section—i.e., 
the liberal, cultural, radical, and postmodern critiques—asking the woman 
question provides a unifying inquiry. The woman’s question’s focus on con-
sequences allows us to frame questions—about how gender shapes legal 
rules, what assumptions are made by the law about women, and whose in-
terests are reflected or deemed peripheral—and then analyze them and reach 
both theoretical and operational conclusions. As Bartlett explains, “A ques-
tion is a method when it is regularly asked.”
218 The woman question is regu-
larly asked in international law but has never been articulated as such. How-
ever, it is safe to say that the central feminist question in international law is 
the question of impact of the law on women.
All feminist methods, in one way or the other, call on scholars to en-
gage in baring the implications of the law on women. Feminist approaches 
vary in the type of guidance they offer for identifying and confronting 
women’s otherness in the legal sphere. The problem is that making a choice 
between these views is not always necessary. It adds complexity that often 
places an unnecessary burden on scholars. This situation certainly goes 
against the general ambition of expanding feminist work in international 
215. See Vanessa E. Munro, Navigating Feminisms: At the Margins, in the Mainstreams
or Elsewhere?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing contemporary in-
ternal debates).
216. SIMMONS, supra note 31.
217. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 60–61 (noting that feminist anal-
ysis in international law has two major roles: one is deconstruction of the values and norms of 
the international legal system and the other is that of reconstruction. The second task requires 
rebuilding the basic concepts of international in ways that would lessen discrimination against 
women). See generally Lacey, supra note 75, at 17 (“[Feminist scholarship] shows a particu-
larly intimate linkage between theory and practice: both with a rejection of any strong division 
between the two. . .; and with an impulse to have effects beyond the academy. Hence feminist 
theory is firmly grounded in particular legal issues.”).
218. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 838.
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law. In order to address the unequal position of women in society, the wom-
an question suggests a general endeavor by which we would systematically 
think of the influence of gender.
Asking the woman question addresses the current need to reconceptual-
ize and reexamine the commonality in feminist projects in international law. 
It offers to challenge aspects of existing legal concepts that disadvantage 
women. It involves analyzing the ways in which sex/gender shape interna-
tional legal rules and how the international law might “fail to take into ac-
count the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than of 
men, for whatever reason.”
219 The woman question explores the impact of 
gender in various ways, asking whether the law places a disproportionate 
burden on women,
220
if so in what ways, and how gender creates social dif-
ferentiation that is unjust or legitimates certain institutional arrangements. 
Moreover, the woman question invites an inquiry into possible amendments 
in the law and proposes thinking of ways to correct the inadequacies schol-
ars might find.
221
It asks for a feminist analysis that reveals gendered legal 
structures and gaps while at the same time offers to explore opportunities
for change. This general constructivist endeavor is important in international 
law, which continually affects the actions and behaviors of the states and, 
more importantly, is used to secure women’s rights all around the world.
222
B.  The Transformative Potential of the Woman Question Analysis in 
International Law
Asking the woman question in international law has another significant 
advantage: it allows us to envision not only ways to remove gender bias, but 
also new paths to set greater goals for our society and to reimagine a better 
world for women and people of all genders - aiming at transformational 
gender equality.
The global system is unique in that it promises constant search for im-
provement in the state of the world’s women. It found several areas of par-
ticular concern: women’s civil and political rights, women’s access to jus-
tice, to health and to education; violence against women; women’s
inequality in the family (under family laws and religious laws) and in the 
labor market. All these areas have been addressed by general instruments, or 
219. Id. at 837.
220. Barak Erez, supra note 11, at 95-97.
221. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 837 ( “Have women been left out of consideration? If so, 
in what ways? How might that omission be corrected? What difference would it make to do 
so?”).
222. See generally Myres McDougal, The Impact Of International Law Upon National 
Law: A Policy Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 25 (1959); SIMMONS, supra note 31; Ka-
ren Knop, Here And There: International Law In Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L  L. &
POLITICS 501 (2000); Harold Honjuh Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law En-
forced, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1998); SHAW, supra note 50, at 265–345; STEINER ET AL., supra
note 84, 1087–1243 (discussing “states as protectors and enforcers of human rights”).
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through CEDAW and other specific treaties and treaty bodies, yet, progress 
has been sorely slow. Despite decades of international commitments to 
women’s rights, violence against women continues to be prevalent in many 
countries, and significant gaps exist in every society of the world between 
women and men on numerous indicators (such as education, health and eco-
nomic status). The Covid-19 pandemic has further undermined many past 
achievements of feminist activism: Women have suffered from domestic 
violence at alarming rates, have been more likely to lose their jobs and carry 
unpaid care work, and were largely under-represented in decision-making 
processes regarding the response to the pandemic. This crisis has shown 
how deeply gender inequality is embedded within our social, legal and eco-
nomic systems. In response to these challenges, the global discussion of 
women’s human rights has gradually widened and deepened in recent years, 
moving beyond seeking to raise awareness and understanding obstacles - to 
encompass a vision of transformed attitudes and profound structural chang-
es in social, political and economic institutions.
223
This process is only be-
ginning. Yet, in many ways, we are now witnessing a transition in the inter-
national understanding of gender equality. We are at a time of a global shift 
in paradigm to transformative equality.
224
Asking the woman question in in-
ternational law can and should encourage a focus on advancing transfor-
mation.
Sandra Fredman has described the concept of transformative equality 
noting that: “Equality as transformation does not aim at a gender-neutral fu-
ture, but one which appropriately takes gender into account. The future is 
not simply one of allowing women into a male defined world. Instead, 
223. See, Ginette Azcona et. al, UN WOMEN, FROM INSIGHT TO ACTION: GENDER 
EQUALITY IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19 (2020), https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-
library/publications/2020/09/gender-equality-in-the-wake-of-covid-19.
224. See e.g., UN WOMEN, A TRANSFORMATIVE STAND-ALONE GOAL ON ACHIEVING 
GENDER EQUALITY, UN WOMEN (June 2013), https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-
do/~/media/AC04A69BF6AE48C1A23DECAEED24A452.ashx; SANDRA FREDMAN & BETH 
GOLDBLATT, DISCUSSION PAPER: GENDER EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (July 2015), 
https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications
/2015/goldblatt-fin.pdf?la=en&vs=1627 (Marking transformative processes as one of four 
dimensions to achieve gender equality. The authors note that the four dimensions of substan-
tive equality are: “to redress disadvantage; to counter stigma, prejudice, humiliation and vio-
lence; to transform social and institutional structures; and to facilitate participation, both in the 
form of political participation and social inclusion”); SOMALI CERISE & FRANCESCA 
FRANCAVILLA, TACKLING THE ROOT CAUSES OF GENDER INEQUALITIES IN THE POST-2015
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2012); Dianne Otto, Disconcerting ‘Masculinities’: Reinventing the 
Gendered Subject(s) of International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN 
FEMINIST APPROACHES, supra note 16, at 105; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrim-
ination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 25 on Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, on Temporary 
Special Measures (2004), https://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a7e0.html; General Rec-
ommendation 25, para 10; Byrnes, supra note 13, at 55–56 (explaining the concept of trans-
formative equality).
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equality for women entails restructuring [of] society so that it is no longer 
male-defined. Transformation requires a redistribution of power and re-
sources and a change in the institutional structures which perpetuate wom-
en’s oppression.”
225
As a unifying method, asking the woman question is es-
sentially a transformative commitment to ensure justice, autonomy, and 
equal social power for women.
Therefore, asking the woman question in international law should take 
into account, on the one hand, the unique characteristics of this system (i.e. 
the distinctive ways it perpetuates women’s inequality), and on the other 
hand, the ways by which it can motivate change and inspire transformative 
processes. With respect to its distinct features, in the past two decades, the 
international legal system has changed continuously both in terms of norma-
tive developments and structural ones.
226
More and more entities engage 
with global rules, interpret them, and, indeed, feminist ideas have been in-
creasingly absorbed into international and domestic institutions in gradual 
processes of interaction, implementation, and collaboration. However, I 
identify four core limiting elements that make the international legal system 
seem impervious to feminist concerns. First, unlike national legal systems, 
international law is bound by states’ agreement and subject to geopolitical 
agendas. It turns to states as its primary subjects. The simple fact remains 
that international law in limited to the issues that states are willing to accept 
supernational supervision.
227
Hence, concerns that are more politically con-
troversial remain “outside the ambit of international law [and] do not seem 
susceptible to development and change in the same way.”
228
Despite the 
progress made, these features of the international legal system continue to 
be stable. The reality is that human rights often do not get materialized for 
those they are meant to protect. The influence of international human rights 
norms on individuals, and especially women, is often less apparent or dis-
counted (e.g. due to lack of compliance or explicit reservations to the trea-
ties).
229
Therefore, feminists continue to share a genuine concern with inter-
national law’s origins and functions and its disciplinary boundaries 
concerning women. Second, women continue to be under-represented in in-
ternational institutions even today, with men making up a majority in almost 
every international institution, including in political bodies, monitoring 
committees, and tribunals.
230
Third, non-observance, lack of implementation 
of international norms by states, and resistance to efforts to advance gender 
225. Fredman, supra note 13.
226. See Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 95, at 17.
227. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 645
(“international law defines the boundaries of agreements by the international community on 
the matters that states are prepared to yield to supranational regulation and scrutiny.”).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 625.
230. See Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men’s Club: Feminist Futures 
for the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 421, 424–29 (1994).
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equality are prevalent and are being increasingly justified on the basis of 
family or traditional values, and on grounds of adherence to religious laws 
and cultural practices.
231
Fourth, the design of the international system is bi-
ased in ways that await being fully revealed as almost all global institutions, 
structures, concepts, and rules were established by men at a time where 
women were considered inferior.
232
Asking the woman question in the area of international law entails un-
covering these elements. Based on this question, I offer to integrate an ana-
lytical model consisting of three stages allowing for a systematic and struc-
tured feminist examination of gender and related social issues in 
international law. The goal of this model is to allow a thorough analysis of 
diverse gender phenomena within a clear frame of thinking that could push 
international thinkers to re-examine the unique inadequacies of the interna-
tional legal system. The first stage involves examining the present global 
regulation of the issue at stake and mapping the relevant international stake-
holders with the mandate or power to address it. The second stage turns to 
impact assessment, which aims to expose silences, as well as regulatory and 
participatory gaps that characterize the international legal system. This ex-
amination involves asking how those global norms affect women, including 
women of different backgrounds. It also involves revealing the hidden so-
cial assumptions underlying these gaps (including any stereotypes, prejudic-
es and narratives that shape the range of possibilities to address the issue).
The final stage, and perhaps the most crucial part, proceeds to a trans-
formative reconstruction endeavor. It involves answering how we can 
reimagine the global and national systems and reshape legal constructions to 
create a gender-just system. This part embodies the idea of transformative 
equality which, as said, expresses the necessity for structural changes and 
long-term transformative processes to address deeply entrenched societal 
inequalities based on gender. Fulfilling its objectives requires redressing ex-
clusionary social structures in the law that perpetuate women’s inequality. 
This proposed analysis is intended to help frame gender issues and to allow 
a systematic and structured feminist examination of related social and legal 
issues in international law. One of the model’s purposes is to ensure that re-
searchers will not refrain from discussing these issues because of confusion 
about the different feminist approaches.
231. See Frances Raday, Recent Developments in the UN Human Rights Council: Tradi-
tional Values and Women’s Right to Equality in the Family, Oxford Human Rights Hub,
OXFORD HUM. RTS. HUB (Sept. 2, 2015), https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/recent-developments-in-
the-un-human-rights-council-traditional-values-and-womens-right-to-equality-in-the-family/.
232. Feminist scholars generally express concern about the marginalization of “women’s
issues” by the existence of separate specialist institutions and legal instruments designed to 
address “women’s concerns.” The claim made is that these institutions were created only as a 
response to the structural and institutional bias of the international legal system. Charlesworth 
& Chinkin, supra note 95, at 17.
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C.  Reimagining the Rules
The first stage of asking the woman question in international law has a 
descriptive nature. The analysis begins by identifying and describing the 
dominant legal norm at stake, asking how it is globally regulated at present. 
This question serves to fully comprehend the scope of international over-
sight, covering relevant international instruments, declarations, resolutions, 
reports, and individual communications. This examination also involves 
identifying the relevant global actors: monitoring bodies, special rappor-
teurs, working groups, international tribunals that attended the issue, includ-
ing major governmental and non-governmental organizations, and others. In 
other words, the analysis starts with the initial task of presenting the interna-
tional legal standards and mapping the relevant institutional bodies. For ex-
ample, examining the right to freedom of religion or belief and its impact on 
women entails identifying the global sources and bodies that address this 
right. Exploring issues such as the situation of women living in poverty in-
volves pointing to the dominant rules and global institutions preoccupied 
with the formulation of standards relating to this matter.
This examination alone may yield interesting findings as to the bodies 
that attend to the matter, as well as to those that do not. It can also expose 
the current paradigms by which these issues are examined. In the case of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief, for instance, it is interesting to find out 
that the CEDAW Committee has no mandate to properly address this right 
or to monitor its implementation, as this right is not enumerated in the Con-
vention. It is also interesting to observe differences in the way that the Hu-
man Rights Committee refers to religious liberties as highly significant as 
opposed to the threat that the CEDAW Committee identifies in justifying 
discrimination against women on the basis of religious practices and laws.
233
The second stage turns to impact assessment. This stage focuses on ex-
posing the effect of the law on women and answering whether and how the 
global regulation of the issue explored in the first stage relates to the reality 
of women’s lives. The impact examination in international contexts is 
unique, as it aims to identify possible silences in the law, neglected areas, 
regulatory or participatory gaps, areas that lack global oversight, or rules 
that are overly broad in ways that obscure possible implementation.
234
The 
woman question invites us to take a closer look at the rules that shape global 
response and that determine the scope of states’ international legal obliga-
tions. It requires paying attention to women’s agency and voice in the sys-
tem, to structural disadvantages or to the ways by which gender issues are 
233. See Elkayam Levy, supra note 95; see also Cochav Elkayam Levy, The Diversity of 
Womanhood and All of God’s Creatures: Addressing Challenges in the Protection of Wom-
en’s Religious Freedoms Using a Novel Classification, 53 CORNELL INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 
2021).
234. Charlesworth, supra note 15, at 381 (claiming that “the silences of international law 
may be as important as its positive rules and rhetorical structures”).
472 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:429
deemed peripheral or simply ignored. The woman question, in this regard, is 
significant as it is designed to expose silences of the law concerning wom-
en. It reveals “how the substance of law may silently and without justifica-
tion submerge the perspectives of women.”
235
It urges us to investigate why 
certain issues have not been deemed deserving of global regulation or su-
pervision. Although searching for silences is not a new technique for inter-
national scholars, the woman question offers a broader framework for its 
application. Charlesworth explains that the method of detecting silences is 
useful for international lawyers since it leads to questions about the objec-
tivity of the discipline. It also relies on the idea that “all systems of 
knowledge depend on deeming certain issues as irrelevant or of little signif-
icance.”
236
Based on this understanding, Charlesworth and Chinkin encour-
age international scholars to ask, “Why are some activities considered ca-
pable of international legal regulation while others are not?”
237
Asking the woman question in international law is thus a continuing ef-
fort to expose the marginalization of women’s experiences. The significance 
of searching for silences in international law goes beyond exposing biases. 
The silences in international law might be more important than the explicit 
rules that appear in the law, because the areas that international law does not 
touch “seem naturally to belong within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states.”
238
The silences of international law define the boundaries of an 
agreement by the international community and are associated with the sub-
jects that were left at the discretion of states.
239
Therefore, the method of 
asking the woman question advances a feminist legal analysis that ultimate-
ly has the power to transform the system.
Moreover, this second part of the impact assessment aims to draw atten-
tion to underlying gendered social perceptions and assumptions. Bartlett 
notes, “in exposing the hidden effects of laws that do not explicitly discrim-
inate on the basis of sex, the woman question helps to demonstrate how so-
cial structures embody norms that implicitly render women different and 
thereby subordinate.”
240
Asking the woman question thus involves checking 
whether, in reality, the law matches or responds to the situation of women. 
And if not, why these gaps exist, and what perceptions or social narratives 
have led to their existence. Take, for instance, the efforts made when femi-
nist scholars noticed that violence against women was not mentioned in the 
Women’s Convention, even though women gravely suffered from violence 
within and out of the home all around the world. Their realization led to a 
235. As well as other excluded groups. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 836.
236. Charlesworth, supra note 15, at 381.
237. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 7, at 60.
238. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 
645.
239. Id.
240. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 843.
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wide range of global actions, including interpretive efforts taken by the 
CEDAW Committee to address this omission.
241
Some of the social barriers
that allowed this gap to persist were exposed as well, including how shame 
prevents women from reporting on violence and how the norm of protecting 
domestic unions from state intervention served to block government actions 
(and global measures) and solidified the overall societal acceptance of vio-
lence against women.
242
Asking the woman question in international law is 
thus necessarily a continuing effort to expose the invisibility of women and 
their experiences.
This last comment brings us to the third stage of asking the woman 
question in international law: the effort of transformative reconstruction. 
The third stage, as noted above, entails analytical reconstruction and is 
transformative in nature. It involves not only considering alternatives to the 
current situation but also reimagining the law or legal constructions so that 
we do not just offer modifications based on what exists. Rather, we offer 
modifications based on an effort to create and express a vision for change –
asking ourselves, for example, what would have been had women had a part 
in the design of the law or what would a gender-just society look like. We 
must allow ourselves to ask bold questions about the future and envision a 
world we truly want for ourselves and for the future generations.
243
The 
U.N. Women Peace and Security Agenda serves as good example of an ap-
proach seeking such transformation by fundamentally altering the global 
perception for achieving lasting and sustainable peace and security. It tack-
les the gendered impacts of armed conflicts and advances women’s partici-
241. Including extensive work by the CEDAW Committee. On July 14, 2017, the Com-
mittee adopted General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, 
updating General Recommendation No. 19. The former General Recommendation No. 19 
from 1992 addressed violence against women as a form and manifestation of gender-based 
discrimination, used to subordinate and oppress women. It was a milestone in the history of 
the work of the Committee since this recommendation brought violence “outside of the pri-
vate sphere and into the realm of human rights.” See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women,
U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992). General Recommendation No. 35 of 2017 expands the response to 
this matter and explains the gender-based nature of this form of violence, building on the work 
of international human rights mechanisms, as well as developments at national, regional, and 
international levels.; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 35 On Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General Rec-
ommendation No. 19., U.N. Doc. .CEDAW/C/GC/35 (Jul. 26, 2017); see also Eur. Consult. 
Ass., Convention on Previnting and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Vio-
lence (Apr. 12, 2011) (The Istanbul Convention was a result of global efforts invested in this 
direction.).
242. See e.g., Margunn Bjørnholt, The Social Dynamics of Revictimization and Intimate 
Partner Violence: An Embodied, Gendered, Institutional and Life Course Perspective, 20
NORDIC J. CRIMINOLOGY 90 (2019).
243. See Donella Meadows, Envisioning a Sustainable World, THE DONELLA 
MEADOWS PROJECT ACAD. FOR SYS. CHANGE, http://donellameadows.org/archives
/envisioning-a-sustainable-world/ (last visited May 7, 2021).
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pation in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.
244
It radically 
changed the global normative perspective of national security, conflict pre-
vention and its resolution. Transformation requires that we be less cynical 
about the possibilities ahead of us and that we take seriously our dearest 
values, thinking in innovative terms about how to reimagine the entire 
framework so that it produces just and sustainable solutions.
245
This ambitious task forces us not to stop when finding gaps but to con-
tinue and look for ways to tackle structural barriers. We ought to search for 
ways that may motivate transformative processes that confront profound 
structural disadvantages. To give another example, we all know that migrant 
women are widely discriminated against globally in almost every aspect of 
their lives and are at risk of suffering grave violations of their human rights. 
Addressing their situation in ways that go beyond traditional solutions with-
in hosting countries, can, for instance, be done through an analysis of the 
entire global financial system, its gendered features, the different ways in 
which it motivates migration, revealing the conventions that dictate restric-
tive migration rules, and suggesting how this system should change to se-
cure women’s rights in the far future. Likewise, addressing women’s pov-
erty after marriage dissolution might suggest not only steps garnering state 
support but also a reconceptualization of the international definitions of the 
labor market to acknowledge and award work carried out in caring for chil-
dren, and the establishment of social institutions that create support net-
works and foster direct involvement of global bodies in securing women’s
material needs. Global institutions should generally aim to have greater fi-
nancial and institutional ability to connect with and support individuals, 
adopting more roles than those traditionally carried as supervisors of states. 
Responses to the situation of women living in poverty should also aim to 
transform social security schemes that depend on contributions from contin-
uous, full-time participation in the paid workforce which disproportionately
disadvantage women whose careers are often interrupted due to childcare 
obligations or part-time work at the informal sector. Transformation can al-
so be achieved by simply looking for new partnerships. Local organizations 
are recently addressing domestic violence through collaboration with tech 
companies and national security bodies to assist victims.
246
They hope that 
in the future governments around the world would treat violence against 
women as a national security matter and regard it as an issue that puts at risk 
the well-being of the population and that jeopardizes the stability of the na-
tional and international economy.
244. S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
245. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 645 
(“To redefine the traditional scope of international law so as to acknowledge the interests of 
women can open the way to reimagining possibilities for change and may permit international 
law’s promise of peaceful coexistence and respect for the dignity of all persons to become a 
reality.”).
246. See supra note 44.
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Scholars must try to take an unorthodox path and imagine the future, 
asking themselves: How would the law look in a gender-just society? Such 
exploration has the potential to yield transformative solutions rather than 
“presently possible” alternatives. In many ways, the woman question in in-
ternational law is very much forward-looking and is predicated on the un-
derstanding that this entire body of law has a tremendous potential to moti-
vate positive change but has been shaped based on certain very problematic 
understandings of women and of gender roles.
247
It is a call for legal imagi-
nation. One important understanding in fulfilling the promise of transforma-
tive change is to embrace this imaginative nature. Envisioning the future is 
not an exclusively rational, nor linear process. Redrafting the premises of 
international law requires the opposite of strict “realistic” thinking. It neces-
sitates intentional work to distance ourselves from our conventions and in-
ternal constraints, suspend disbelief and ask ourselves again and again what 
our vision is for the system and for a better world more generally.
248
To im-
agine and achieve transformation, we must not limit ourselves to the present 
nor compromise on the changes that we believe are at reach.
249
Transfor-
mation becomes possible when we allow ourselves to be sincere with our 
ambitions and not scared to dream. As Donella H. Meadows has brilliantly 
put it, the process of building a vision, “comes from values, not logic.”
250
No 
doubt it is a new muscle for us to practice. The woman question opens up 
this space for rethinking the relationship between the law and systematic 
discrimination to enable the construction of a new sense of respect to wom-
en’s equal place in society.
This suggested model for asking the woman question in international 
law has many advantages for international legal scholars thinking of how 
the current international legal regime impacts women. Applying the woman 
question motivates an important inquiry about the nature of our international 
legal knowledge, whom and what fields are privileged, and which are si-
lenced and undervalued in ways that could ultimately lead to significant 
findings. This method also offers hope and encourages a much richer under-
standing of gender in international law. It has powerful theoretical and prac-
tical potential for scrutinizing international law while acknowledging its 
ability to mobilize change. It calls on international scholars to identify, ex-
plain, and strive to transform the areas in the law that fall short of fulfilling 
the basic promise for a just global legal system.
247. Charlesworth, supra note 15, at 381 (“By and large, when women enter into focus 
at all in international law, they are viewed in a very limited way, often as victims, particularly 
as mothers, or potential mothers, in need for protection.”).
248. Meadows, supra note 243.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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Conclusion
The feminist project in international law is visionary. Its reformative 
power serves as an inspiration to many in their path to influence the future 
and imagine a better world. Feminists take upon themselves to rethink and 
reshape the boundaries of the international legal system with the goal of se-
curing human rights and addressing women’s experiences. This article 
delved into the depth of this ambition, aiming to clarify what it means to 
apply feminist methods in international law and presenting a construct for 
unifying them in an overarching framework. It began by explaining the de-
velopment of gender in international law and presented the sets of questions 
that feminist methods in international law offer. These methods are particu-
larly significant for scholars, and engaging with them reveals the richness of 
feminist thought. Each is important for informing and ascertaining a femi-
nist position. The different, sometimes clashing, feminist views present 
challenges but mainly add a requirement to choose between them or some-
how fuse their insights. To address this difficulty, this article ultimately as-
pired to emphasize the contribution of an overarching method of asking the 
woman question in international law. This question aims to reveal the im-
pact of gender on the design of legal rules. I argue that the woman question
is the central feminist question in international law and a widely shared in-
quiry. The model offered here for its implementation in international law 
underscores its transformative potential. It encourages international scholars 
to reveal gendered legal structures and gaps, while at the same time, to dis-
cover and study opportunities for change. Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Shel-
ley Wright long ago pointed out that their work in international law involves 
“looking behind the abstract entities of states to the actual impact of rules on 
women within states.”
251
The purpose of this article has been to emphasize 
just that and to turn this general ambition into a clear analytical scheme.
Based on the method of asking the woman question, this article devel-
oped a future oriented analytical model specifically designed to address the 
most deeply-rooted faults of the international legal system. Concisely, the 
woman question analysis in international law (a) identifies the dominant in-
ternational legal norms and relevant stakeholders; (b) assesses the norms’
impact on women, including on women of different backgrounds, by uncov-
ering silences, regulatory and participatory gaps, and underlying gendered 
social assumptions; and (c) undertakes a transformative reconstruction en-
deavor. This last stage is intended to encourage transformative processes 
that confront entrenched social and legal gendered structures within the in-
ternational legal system. It requires a complicated intellectual effort to 
reimagine the future as means to move towards a gender-just global system.
As stated at the onset of this project, methods matter. Methods explain 
the work that we do in law. They are the way by which we produce valid 
251. Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 7, at 
614.
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knowledge.
252
The method of asking the woman question is significant in 
that it is an effective approach to the law. First, it tackles the very sensitive 
and dynamic relations between law and society when they touch the lives of 
women. It regards gender as crucially important to our understanding of the 
law. The analysis founded on the basis of the woman question invites in-
depth consideration of international legal norms together with an examina-
tion of the hidden social assumptions that they represent. Second, the wom-
an question reveals the blind spots of our international legal knowledge. 
Asking the woman question demands a constant search for unregulated or 
minimally regulated areas, which bear tremendously challenging implica-
tions on the status of women. It thus can capture the most static problems of 
the international system. Third, asking the woman question has the potential 
to expand gender-based research in international law as it concentrates the 
framing of gender issues around the singular question of impact. The focus 
on impact makes feminist work in international contexts far more accessible 
than before. Finally, asking the woman question can push the boundaries of 
the discipline of international law by encouraging a journey to its unknown 
future. This effort emphasizes the need to engage with the challenging task 
of reinventing an international legal system which was formed without the 
involvement of women nor in regard to their needs and interests. Hopefully, 
reimagining the future will be the most empowering, fulfilling, and trans-
formative result of this work.
252. MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 1019. As Nancy Hartsock has noted, “at bottom, fem-
inism is a mode of analysis, a method of approaching life and politics, a way of asking ques-
tions and searching for answers, rather than a set of political conclusions about the oppression 
of women.” Nancy Hartsock, Feminist Theory and the Development of Revolutionary Strate-
gy, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 56, 58–59 (Z. R. 
Eisenstein ed., 1979).

